


THE POLITICAL STATUS OF PUERTO RICO--A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE
1967 AND 1993 PLEBISCITES



By

MILTON O. RODRIGUEZ

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THE POLITICAL STATUS OF PUERTO RICO--A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE
1967 AND 1993 PLEBISCITES

By

Milton O. Rodriguez

May 1998

Chairman: Dr. Terry L. McCoy

Major Department: Center for Latin American Studies

This thesis is a comparative study of the 1967 and 1993 plebiscites held to determine whether Puerto Rico would remain a commonwealth, become a state, or attain independence. It provides a short and concise description of Puerto Rico's political status, its current relationship with the United States, and the possible future direction of that relationship. The reader will find a brief history of Puerto Rico's development from Spanish control to U. S. control. The research includes data and analysis from the 1967 and 1993 plebiscites (nonbinding on the U. S. Congress) and gubernatorial elections from 1948 to 1996, as well as electoral data from the city of Humacao for a case study. A proposal is before the U.S. Congress to hold another plebiscite in 1998 that would be binding on Congress. Chapter 4 presents a case study that suggests a possible winning outcome of the proposed 1998 plebiscite.

The Puerto Rico State Electoral Commission is the source for electoral results data. I used SPSS, a statistical software program, to analyze the data. I concluded that the people of Puerto Rico are shifting their status preference from commonwealth to statehood because they fear political instability and economic decline if U.S. ties are not guaranteed, while cultural identity explains the slow pace occurring between the commonwealth and statehood option preferences.

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

This research attempts to answer why the people of Puerto Rico shifted their preference between the 1967 and 1993 plebiscites that the government of Puerto Rico held to define its political status as a U.S. state, a commonwealth, or an independent republic. The commonwealth was the winner formula on both plebiscites, however its supporters are decreasing while the statehood supporters are increasing in number. The political status of Puerto Rico has gained increased attention in the U.S. Congress during the past seven years (Gautier Mayoral 1996, 170). Congress held hearings and deliberations (in 1997) on the island's political status. Congressional hearings also were conducted in Puerto Rico in April 1997. The U.S. Congress Natural Resources Committee has as its goal a plebiscite in 1998 on the island's political status. Therefore Puerto Rico's political status could change as early as the end of 1998. I want to emphasize that the focus of this study is not whether statehood, commonwealth, or independence will win a future plebiscite, but on which variables seem to influence individual preferences on the status issue. The status question, or what I refer to as ideology, is whether the people of Puerto Rico want it to become a U.S. state, become an independent republic, or maintain its commonwealth status. People's ideological interests are mutable and subject to continual redefinition in direct proportion to changes or perceived changes in their

politico-economic situation. That is, people's ideology will remain constant as long as their goals are being met (Gilpin 1981, 50-51).

Problem Statement

Central Question: Why did Puerto Ricans voters' preference shift toward statehood between the 1967 and 1993 plebiscites?

Hypothesis: The ongoing slow shift in preference toward statehood is due to cultural identity and fear of economic decline and political instability, as has occurred in other Latin American countries, if Puerto Rico's ties to the United States are not guaranteed.

One could say that Puerto Rico's political status has been in question since 1493. When Columbus came to the island, it was inhabited already. Today more than 3.7 million people live on the island (Inter-American Development Bank 1994) and more than 3 million Puerto Ricans on the U.S. mainland. The people of Puerto Rico became U.S. citizens in 1917 by decree, not by choice. The people of Puerto Rico have intensified their grappling with the question of statehood, independence, or commonwealth since the 1950s. The establishment of the commonwealth, officially in 1952, was supposed to end the status debate of Puerto Rico but it did not.

Puerto Rican politics revolve around the question of status, because each of the main political parties advocates a different position on status. Puerto Rico's colonial structure has not changed much since the United States seized control in 1898. The United States established a civil government in 1900. It was almost totally controlled by the United States until 1949, when the first elected Puerto Rican governor inaugurated his

tenure. The legislative branch already was elected by popular vote. Superior court judges were to be appointed by the governor with consultation of the senate. Every election since then may be considered a plebiscite. That is, each of the three major political parties represents one of the three ideologies of the people of Puerto Rico: statehood, commonwealth (current status), and independence.

Since the 1952 commonwealth constitution, two plebiscites have been held concerning the island's political status; both were non-binding on the U.S. Congress. The 1967 plebiscite reaffirmed the commonwealth. Supported by the Popular Democratic Party (PPD), it obtained more than 60% of the vote. The statehood option, supported by what would become the New Progressive Party (PNP), received more than 30% of the vote, and the independence option, supported by the Puerto Rican Independence Party (PIP) movement, only 0.6% of the votes. The 1993 plebiscite reaffirmed the commonwealth position, but only by 48% of the vote, with statehood and independence options receiving 46% and 4%, respectively. While it became increasingly clear that the independence movement would not have a chance, one can see an ongoing change in preferences between the 1967 and the 1993 plebiscite in favor of statehood.

A bill that was before the U.S. Congress in Spring 1997 calls for a plebiscite not later than December 1998 to define and later implement the choice of the people of Puerto Rico concerning their political status. Congress may exercise the power, under Article IV of the U.S. Constitution, to determine the status of Puerto Rico.

Significance

What the people of Puerto Rico think about their political status is not only an issue for the United States and Puerto Rico but also for all U.S. territories and, since the 1950s, for the world, because of the United Nations' involvement with worldwide decolonization. Finding out why the people of Puerto Rico chose one option over another could shed light on what the outcome will be of the proposed 1998 plebiscite. Another reason for this research is that this is the first time since the 1960s that the United States has initiated legislation regarding the political status of Puerto Rico. There was a U.S. congressional attempt in 1989 to draft a bill to define the political status of Puerto Rico. That effort materialized in 1997 into a bill, H.R. 856 or the Young Bill. It appears that the United States might promote a new role for Puerto Rico after the Cold War. Several concurrent events can account for this renewed interest. First, Puerto Rico played a geopolitical role during the Cold War. Second, the United States is trying to balance the budget not later than the first decade in the twenty-first century. Third, dictatorial regimes in Latin America and Eastern Europe have fallen in conjunction with democratic elections throughout the regions. Finally, the industrialization experiment, Operation Bootstrap, was an example to emulate by Latin American countries; however, the context has changed and the results of the Bootstrap experiment are not encouraging enough to be used as a model for economic development.

Review of Literature

The literature pertaining to Puerto Rico is abundant, varied, and polemical. However, at the present, no literature compares the 1967 and 1993 plebiscites.

Nevertheless, the literature helps to understand why the people of Puerto Rico chose one status option over another. Raymond Carr's *Puerto Rico: A Colonial Experiment* (1984) provides an analysis of Puerto Rico's colonial relations with Spain and the United States. It traces the evolution of Puerto Rico from Spanish control to its contemporary relation with the United States up to about 1982. Another excellent source is found in Sir Harold Mitchell's *Caribbean Patterns* (1972). Mitchell presents a synopsis of the history and the economic and political development of Puerto Rico. Annadrue Harris Brownback presents the findings of her dissertation, *Congressional and Insular Opposition to Puerto Rican Autonomy* (1966), on U.S. and Puerto Rican politicians' feelings about Puerto Rico's political status and development up to the late 1960s. Edwin and Edgardo Melendez's *Colonial Dilemma* (1993) provides us with a more detailed and contemporary view of Puerto Rico's political status. Roland I. Perusse's *The United States and Puerto Rico* (1987) has a foreword written by former President Gerald Ford, who is the only U.S. president to openly propose and defend the statehood option for Puerto Rico.

The economic literature also is abundant. I would like to mention a few authors who have written about this subject. Deborah Berman-Santana's, book *Kicking off the Bootstraps* (1996) presents a contemporary and environmental perspective of the economic development of Salinas, a town in the south of Puerto Rico. A. W. Maldonado's *Teodoro Moscoso and Puerto Rico's Operation Bootstrap* (1997) presents the economic miracle of what was called Operation Bootstrap and the people behind it. It illustrates the significance of the industrial development and economic research conducted by the government of Puerto Rico and how the island went from rags to riches.

Approach and Research Design

The study will use a rational choice approach, defining a rational man or woman as a person who will calculate the benefits involved in his or her decisions (Jenkins 1978, 6). A person presented with several options would elect the one with the highest pay-off and minimum effort required. Therefore, this person would back a political party's ideology because the incentives offered are attractive to him or her. A person will act rationally whether he has egoistic or altruistic motives or values. In this case the incentives are a strong economy and a stable political system. I am defining a strong economy as one in which the majority of the population (80 % or more) has an income to meet basic needs and afford certain luxuries. A stable political system in this context is one that has a democratic system, free and fair elections, and a balance of power between the judiciary, legislative, and executive branches. However, when the incentives or pay-offs are less than the effort involved, a person will change his or her political ideology.

I am comparing and analyzing two sets of politico-economic conditions, in 1967 and 1993, and their results. I also analyze and compare the gubernatorial elections since 1948 to 1996, with emphasis on the 1992 and 1968 elections, and the 1967 and 1993 plebiscites. The city of Humacao served as the case study because of its parallelism with the island. In addition, I conducted a survey, at Humacao, of the possible results of the 1998 plebiscite.

I conducted 120 interviews in Puerto Rico during summer 1997¹ : 60 people who had the possibility of voting in the 1967 and 1993 plebiscites and who might vote in the proposed 1998 plebiscite; 30 people who did not vote in the 1967 plebiscite but voted in the 1993 plebiscite and have the potential of voting in the 1998 plebiscite; and finally, 30 people who did not vote in either previous plebiscite but plan to vote in the 1998 plebiscite. I will explain the rationale of this technique in chapter 4. It may appear to the reader that some degree of bias exists in this research. There is a recall problem because people might not remember why they chose a particular option thirty years earlier. The voters who did not vote in 1967 but voted in 1993 will provide their current trend when answering for the 1998 option. The latter can also be said about voters that did not vote in either plebiscite. The nature and direction of the survey should be relatively free of bias because I surveyed every second household in different sectors of the city to ensure inclusion of middle, lower, and upper income persons; I surveyed urban and rural dwellers. However, the highest income sector is missing from the sample. Nevertheless, the study should be valuable.

Chapter 2 presents a brief history of Puerto Rico's political system and political parties. It includes a discussion of why status is an issue. Chapter 3 presents a discussion

¹ The interviews were not as easy to conduct as I assumed. I would like to share an anecdote with the reader. There used to be a tendency in Puerto Rican folklore to identify a person's political party by the color of his clothing. The main political parties are identified with a color. Red is the color of PPD or supporters of the commonwealth status, blue is for the PNP or statehood defenders, and green is for the PIP or independence status. The first person that I interviewed pointed out to me, during the middle of the interview, that I was wearing the wrong color shirt for the interview. I was wearing a red shirt and he happens to be a believer in independence. Therefore I adjusted the color of my clothing to reflect neutral colors while conducting the interviews thereafter.

and analysis of available data on the elections and plebiscites held in Puerto Rico since 1948; it contains a discussion of the three status options available during the two previous plebiscites and a possible fourth option in 1998. I will compare politico-economic conditions in 1967 and 1993 to see if the options available had different or similar incentives. Chapter 4 presents the case study of the city of Humacao, one of the 78 cities; or municipalities in Puerto Rico, along with a brief history of Humacao and a discussion of why I chose that city. In chapter 5, I present my conclusion.

CHAPTER 2

POLITICAL HISTORY OF PUERTO RICO

This chapter briefly examines Puerto Rico's background, political history, and political system. The island's status has been in question since Spanish control. Puerto Rico was attacked many times by the British, French, and Dutch, while under Spain's control, yet no enemy power was able to maintain control of the island for an extended time. Spanish control over the island ended in 1898 as a result of the Spanish-American War. Therefore, a brief look at Puerto Rico's political situation prior to 1898 is warranted. Another purpose of this chapter is to familiarize the reader with Puerto Rico's three main political parties and their platforms. I will briefly discuss the evolution of the political parties in Puerto Rico, emphasizing the mid-twentieth century to the present, which status option each party supports, and the parties' proposed goals and strategies.

Early Political History

Puerto Rico is in the center of the Caribbean Antilles, roughly 1,000 miles southeast of Miami. Puerto Rico's population in 1994, as reported by the Inter-American Development Bank, was approximately 3.7 million. It is estimated that another 3 million Puerto Ricans reside on U.S. mainland. Spanish is the official language. However, a substantial proportion of the population also speaks English. The island is approximately 100 miles by 35 miles, or about the size of Connecticut. The Spanish arrived in Puerto Rico in 1493 on Columbus' second voyage to the New World. Columbus found the island

inhabited by indigenous people, whom Spanish called Tainos. The Taino people hunted, fished, and planted crops for subsistence. There are no pure Tainos left on the island today (Falk 1986, xxvi). However, in certain parts of the interior of the island, the population still bears features such as high cheekbones, slanted eyes, and brown skin (Garcia Passalacqua 1984, 17). Ethnically, Puerto Ricans are primarily a mix of Spanish and African.

The Spaniards built several fortresses on the island. The most famous is "El Morro" located in San Juan, the capital. Thick walls and sentry turrets called "garitas del Diablo"-- Devil's watchtowers -- made San Juan impregnable to military attacks. Agriculture was not developed except for subsistence of the garrison forces. Spanish seeking gold did not settle in Puerto Rico because its gold was exhausted quickly during the early years of colonization. Spanish loyalists from other areas resettled in Puerto Rico, seeking refuge after the independence wars that broke out in Latin America (Garcia Passalacqua 1984, 24-25). This may be one reason the majority of Puerto Ricans did not pursue independence during the nineteenth century.

The majority of Puerto Ricans pursued autonomy instead of independence during the latter part of the nineteenth century. Autonomy as a movement resulted from Puerto Rico's electing its first delegate, Ramon Power, to the "Cortes de Cadiz" (Cadiz's Courts) in 1810. The Courts, located in Spain, were created at the beginning of the nineteenth century as a forum of parliamentary or democratic representation. Spain enacted a law in 1815 that granted economic incentives to new immigrants settling in Puerto Rico. As the

population grew on the island, so did identification with Puerto Rico, not Spain, as the fatherland.

With the increase in population, a new elite emerged in the island. This new elite had studied in Spain and around 1840 started to seek the end of slavery in Puerto Rico, which was officially abolished in 1873 (Garcia Passalacqua 1984, 26). The abolitionist movement gradually evolved into an independence movement. In 1868, a famous local revolt, "El Grito de Lares," served as the landmark of the independence movement of Puerto Rico. However, Puerto Rico's independence movement did not turn into a strong and significant force as did the one in Cuba, though it did have ties to the Cuban independence movement. Many Puerto Ricans fought and promoted the independence of Cuba (Cuban American National Foundation 1987, 8-10). Prior to Cuba's independence, Puerto Rico and Cuba worked closely together seeking the end of slavery, which ended in Cuba in 1880, seven years after abolition in Puerto Rico. Cuban and Puerto Rican delegations to the courts in Spain obtained autonomous status in 1897. Cuba's influence in Puerto Rico remained evident in the politicians of that era, who in turn demonstrated mixed political feelings on the island.

Beginning in about 1868, the island's politics feature a division between those supporting Spain's policies toward the island and those seeking participation with equal treatment from Spain. Those supporting Spain's policies were in favor of the status quo and called themselves "incondicionales" (unconditionals). Those seeking equal treatment developed a political party, eventually named "Partido Autonomista" (Autonomist Party), which sought greater local government control and administrative decentralization. Spain

responded by repressing the autonomist movement (Garcia Passalacqua 1984, 27). The autonomist movement survived Spanish repression, but it split between those seeking to maintain ties with Spanish political parties and those who did not. Later, these two factions evolved into the "Partido Popular Democratico" (PPD) and "Partido Nuevo Progresista" (PNP). More importantly, the product of the autonomists' work culminated with Spain's granting an autonomous letter to Puerto Rico in 1897 (Garcia-Angulo 1964, 15, Hernandez Colón; 1976, 2).

The autonomous letter did not grant independence; rather, it allowed for more freedom than ever before. Spain retained veto power in insular affairs, appointed a governor to be the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and had final authority over the island. In addition, Spain created an Insular Parliament (Wagenheim and Jimenez de Wagenheim 1994) consisting of an Administrative Council and a House of Representatives. The 35 members of the house were popularly elected. The Administrative Council had a mix of seven appointed and seven elected members. The parliament could propose laws, impose taxes, and enter into treaties with foreign nations.

Puerto Rico remained an autónomous colony of Spain until 1898, when U.S. troops occupied Puerto Rico as part of their strategy against Spain during the Spanish-American War. The people of the island offered little resistance against the U.S. forces at the time of the occupation. The occupying forces took a third of the island within three weeks (Office of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico 1964, 53-54). Puerto Rico was ceded to United States under Article II of the Treaty of Paris, December 10, 1898.

The Treaty of Paris granted United States control of Spain's West Indies and Guam as well as Puerto Rico, under Article II, and the Philippines islands for a payment of twenty million dollars under Article III. Under Article I, Cuba was to be temporarily occupied; that is, Cuba was not ceded and virtually was granted independence. U.S. military occupation in Cuba ended in 1902. However, Cuba's sovereignty was restricted by the Platt Amendment to the Cuban constitution. The Platt Amendment allowed for the United States to intervene in Cuba at any time to protect U.S. property, sustain civil order, or repel foreign aggression. In addition, it granted to the United States the right to establish a naval base on Cuba. The Treaty of Paris articles IX and XI I legalized U.S. control over Puerto Rico.

The U.S. Constitution grants control over U.S. territories to the U.S. Congress. Therefore, the U.S. Congress has since exercised its authority over Puerto Rico under the territorial clause of the U.S. Constitution, Article IV, Section 3. The Treaty of Paris guaranteed the people of Puerto Rico the right to their private property and freedom of religion (articles IX and X) but did not specify the form of government. Therefore, Puerto Rico became a dependency of the United States, although the precise nature of the relationship was not defined.

History of the Commonwealth

Puerto Rico's current form of government is a democratic commonwealth with the United States of America. Its head of state is the president of the United States, but the head of the government is the governor. The legislative assembly consists of a senate with 29 members and a House of Representatives with 53 members. The legislature and

governor are popularly elected every four years in general elections. The voting age was 21 until 1976, when it became 18. There are eight senatorial districts and 78 municipalities. This system has evolved into its current status from Spanish origins and nearly a century of U.S. rule.

The people of Puerto Rico managed to get approval for an autonomous form of government from Spain in 1897, just before U.S. intervention. Spain had granted the status of province to Puerto Rico in 1869. This made all Puerto Ricans Spanish citizens. United States changed those conditions first in 1900 with the Foraker Act and later with the Jones Act in 1917.

The 1900 Foraker Act created a temporary government that lasted 17 years, with a governor as the chief executive of the island. This governor was appointed by the president of the United States. The law established a legislative branch composed of an executive council with eleven members named by the president and a lower house of 35 members elected by the people of Puerto Rico. Up to this point, this was very similar to the autonomy granted by Spain in 1897. However, one fundamental difference was that Spain used the assistance of Puerto Rican delegates in drafting trade treaties affecting the island (Garcia-Angulo 1964, 15-16; Wagenheim 1994, 54). The Foraker law also established a judiciary composed by the Supreme Court with five judges appointed by the president. Six of the Executive Council members would be head of governmental agencies; that is, they would exercise dual duties. Therefore, one may say that the president dictated almost every political aspect of the island in appointing the executive (governor),

one-fourth of the legislature, and the judiciary (judges). Six Executive Council members were heads of Puerto Rico's governmental agencies.

Puerto Rico was represented at the federal level by a resident commissioner, who was a non-voting member of the U.S. Congress and elected by the people of Puerto Rico. This resident commissioner did not have the authority to vote on congressional matters. However, he could voice the concerns of his constituency. Under Spanish control, the island had sixteen deputies and two senators with full powers in the courts of Spain (Garcia-Angulo 1964, 16). Currently, the resident commissioner has the right to vote within the U.S. congressional committees that he or she may be a member of but not on the floor.

After seventeen years, a new relationship was established with the Jones Act signed by the president on March 2, 1917. It granted U.S. citizenship to the people of Puerto Rico; it provided guidelines for the elections that were held in July, 1917 and November 1920; and it established that elections would be held every four years after the 1920 elections. U.S. citizenship was a condition most Puerto Ricans appreciated (appendix B). Gautier Mayoral pointed out:

However, when holding a plebiscite in Puerto Rico became important to the United States in early 1989, and an erroneous staff report of the Senate Committee on Natural Resources mentioned the loss of U.S. citizenship under any option other than statehood, the statehood preference grew to 41 percent of the electorate in October 1989, and to 43 percent in January 1990 (1996, 170).

The residents of Puerto Rico, that is, U.S. citizens claiming Puerto Rico as their legal residence, could not vote in U.S. congressional or presidential elections. At the same time, they are not required to pay federal taxes unless they hold a federal job.

The Jones Act was amended several times between 1947 and 1952 to allow more autonomy for the island. Congress also approved election by popular vote of a governor for Puerto Rico. The people of Puerto Rico already elected their legislature by that time. Another change allowed the governor to appoint the heads of agencies with the consultation of the local senate. In 1950, Congress opened the doors for declaring Puerto Rico as a commonwealth or *estado libre asociado* (free associated state) with the passage of Public Law 600 of the U.S. Congress authorizing the drafting of a constitution for Puerto Rico.

The constitution of Puerto Rico, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, came into effect on July 25, 1952. The commonwealth was a mixed formula proposed by Luis Muñoz Marín, Popular Democratic Party (PPD) founder, as an alternative to independence and statehood. The commonwealth constitution superseded several sections of the Jones Act. Among them were elimination of Section 34, which granted to Congress the power to annul any law enacted by the local legislature. Section 34 also authorized the president to overrule the governor's veto of local legislation. The constitution also eliminated Sections 20 and 40, which granted the president the power to appoint the judges and auditors of the island's Supreme Court. The basic features of the commonwealth were the same that had been developed in the United States and long implanted in Puerto Rico, including the separation of powers into three branches and provision for their balancing and interaction. The approval of the constitution of Puerto Rico in fact created a local autonomous system of government.

In 1948, Luis Muñoz Marin became the first Puerto Rican governor elected by popular vote.¹ He officially became governor in 1949. His leadership and vision shaped the fundamental character of Puerto Rico. Luis Muñoz Marin was a charismatic, assertive, and decisive leader. He was knowledgeable about local and U.S. politics. His abilities as leader and politician were instrumental in persuading the people of Puerto Rico to accept the proposed commonwealth (Delgado 1994). The approach used by the autonomistas or his father in the 1890s was the same one Muñoz Marin used in the 1940s and ultimately in the 1960s. He stressed economic and cultural advantages (Jameson 1972, 110) of the commonwealth arrangement. He was concerned with the quality of life, that is, the abolition of poverty (Morales Carrion 1990, 57).

Muñoz petitioned President Kennedy to make changes in the commonwealth arrangement in the early 1960s (Jameson 1972, 129). He asked for freer trade and commerce and self government without breaking away from the metropolis. His effort was rewarded with the creation of the Status Commission through passage of Public Law 271 on February 20, 1964 (Department of State of Puerto Rico 1967, 43-44). The commission recommended in August 1966 to the president and the Congress to hold a plebiscite on the three possible options. There were other political parties that had been advocating independence and statehood since Spanish rule. Today, the three main political parties continue to differ over the political status of the island. The New Progressive Party (PNP) advocates U.S. statehood, the Popular Democratic Party (PPD) defends the status quo;

¹ Jesus T. Piñero was the first Puerto Rican governor. He was appointed by the president in 1946. Before Piñero there has been 98 Spaniard governors and 18 U.S. (Bavron Toro 1984, 207).

and the Puerto Rican Independence Party (PIP) advocates for independence. Thus, political status remains a leading issue in Puerto Rican politics.

Political Parties

Political parties are a modern invention. Bayron Toro (1984, 7) said

A political party is an organization of masses which operates in a modern political system, with the immediate goal of winning by electoral means the control of the government, and it has a longer term goal of influencing and controlling the political power of public decisions in favor of its leadership, rank and file, and for the benefit of the community.

Political parties, all else being equal, are the vehicle used by the people to win office and influence policy in the government. Political scientists have classified political parties into popular and elitist parties. Popular parties try to represent as many people as possible, while elitist parties represent limited particular interests. Puerto Rico's political parties are popular parties. However, before one could talk about modern and contemporary Puerto Rican politics, a brief history of the political parties is required.

Since 1800 at least one party has represented each of the three status positions: statehood, commonwealth (autonomy), or independence (table 1.1).

A realignment of the political parties occurred in the 1940s and 1950s. The Liberal Puertorriqueño party became the PPD in 1938 led by Luis Muñoz Marín. Some of the new blood that went into the PPD's ranks came from the pro-statehood Union Republicana Socialista. In 1948, some of the PPD's leadership shifted to the separatist side and joined the newly created PIP, which promoted independence. The statehood supporters either

Table 1.1
Evolution of Political Parties' Tendencies in Puerto Rico

	Independence	Autonomy	Statehood
1800	Separatismo	Puertorriqueñismo	Españolismo
1809	"	Liberalismo	Conservatismo
1850	"	Reformiso	"
1870	"	Liberal Reformista	"
1871	"		Liberal Conservador
1873	"	Federal Reformista	"
1880			Incondicional Español
1887	"	Autonomista	"
1897	"	Liberal Fusionista	"
		Historico u Orthodoxo	"
1898	"	Union Autonomista Liberal	Oportunista
1899	"	Federal	Republicano Puertorriqueño
1902	"	Union de Puerto Rico	"
1908	"	"	Obrero Insular
1912	La Independencia	"	
1915	"	"	Socialista
1922	Nacionalista	"	Republicano Puertorriqueño
1924	"	"	Constitucional Histórico
1928	"	Allianza Puertorriqueño	Socialista Constitucional
1932	"	Liberal Puertorriqueño	Union Republicana Socialista
1940	"	Popular Democratico (PPD)	Tri-party Unification
1944	"	Liberal Puertorriqueño	Union Republicana Progresista
1948	Independentista (PIP)	Reformista	Estadista
1952	"		Republicano Estadista
1959	Movimiento Pro-Independencia		
1960			Acción Cristina
1968		Del Pueblo	Nuevo Progresista ²
1972	Union Puertorriqueña		
1976	Socialista Puertorriqueño		

Source: Adapted from Fernando Bayron Toro 1984, *Elecciones y Partidos*

Políticos de Puerto Rico, Mayaguez, Puerto Rico: Editorial Isla.

² Note: The PNP has been the main political party advocating statehood since 1968. The PPD has been the main political party advocating commonwealth since 1940. The PIP has been the main political party advocating independence since 1948.

received former autonomists into their ranks or provided former statehood supporters to the autonomists ranks during the 1940s and 1950s. Fundamental changes also took place in U.S.-Puerto Rican relations with the introduction of the Commonwealth. This prompted changes in political parties' ideologies, economic policies, and views on the role of local government. Some claim that Puerto Rico's problems in the 1980s and the 1990s are rooted in the policies enacted in the 1940s.

The three largest contemporary parties are the New Progressive Party (Partido Nuevo Progresista, PNP), the Popular Democratic Party (Partido Popular Democratico, PPD), and the Puerto Rican Independent Party (Partido Independentista Puertorriqueño, PIP). Several lesser groups mainly seek independence but lack the membership to be recognized as official political parties.

The PNP's principal ideology and goal are for Puerto Rico to become the fifty-first state of the United States of America. Its followers are from all segments of the Puerto Rican society, and origin is the same as the PPD's. The autonomists' split resulted in creation of the Puerto Rican Republican Party (Partido Republicano Puertorriqueño), in 1899. Its founder, Dr. Jose Celso Barbosa,⁷ and the party advocated statehood. This Republican Party evolved in 1968 into the New Progressive Party, founded by Luis A. Ferré. Its party platform declares

Puerto Rico has achieved one of the highest level of life and productivity in the hemisphere, thanks to the contribution of the United States in all the areas of our lives. The basic relationship with the American nation is based in our common

citizenship. Our political, social, and economic relationship must be strengthened until reaching the equal citizenship status through statehood. (p. 99)³

The PNP works for the advancement of statehood. The party has 32 goals divided into four major categories: status, public security, employment and economy, and social services. The primary objective regarding status is to convince the U.S. Congress to authorize a plebiscite. Other goals appeal to voters who want jobs, security in their neighborhoods, a health plan, and so forth.

The PPD wants to maintain the commonwealth status quo of with additional autonomy. Its roots are in the Autonomist Party, and its founder was Luis Muñoz Marín, in 1940. The rank and file used to be almost the total electorate of the island. That is, the PPD maintained hegemony over island political activity from 1940 to 1968 (table 2.3 in chapter 2). The PPD worked to improve the quality of life on the island during its period of hegemony, and its success can be associated with the U.S. federal aid that the island received.

Luis Muñoz Marín was the person in charge of federal programs that provided nutritional assistance and medical care in the island in the 1940s. In addition, he implemented Operation Bootstrap, which transformed the underdeveloped and stagnant Puerto Rican economy, based on agriculture, into a progressive economy sustained by an industrial base.

All this was terribly difficult. It involved the building of the infrastructure, a new transportation system, competitiveness among airlines, among shipping lines and all this kind of things

³ For a detailed version of these goals see *Vision 2000 Construyendo el Nuevo Puerto Rico Ahora*, Programa de Gobierno 1997-2000, Partido Nuevo Progresista (PNP) San Juan, 1996.

I don't know if it was a miracle. But it was an incredible job that was accomplished. (Maldonado 1997, 231)

People associated their well-being with Muñoz Marín. The PPD platform of 1997 summarizes the party's position:

The Commonwealth is the reality that Puerto Rico had lived for almost half of a century. It is the status responsible for the significance progress that have occurred in those past long years. It is, above all the status of the future. It encompasses the principles of economic interdependence that animate the European Union, and that flourished in the Treaty of Free Trade, and in MERCOSUR. At the same time, the Commonwealth allows us to affirm our nationality, establish the primacy of our language, cultivate the love and respect for our flag and our anthem, retain our international personality in the Arts, Science, and Sports; and to feel a great pride for our condition of Caribbean and Latin-American people that refuses to wear someone else's clothing in exchange for one's soul.

The Commonwealth is flexibility and dynamism. Only the Commonwealth can evolve to adapt to the times. The particulars about the relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States can always be object of revision and improvement, but that revision cannot undermine the principles of Puerto Rican affirmation, democracy, bilateralism, and government by consent of those that are governed. . . . and we will settle the foundations for the future of our loved country in the union of wills, affection, and of citizenship with the great people of the United States (PPD 1997, 76)⁴.

According to the PPD, the best alternative for Puerto Rico is the status quo, because the commonwealth is the only option that reconciles the benefits of statehood and independence. Its approach is similar to the PNP's appeal of tangible incentives. However, the PPD's emphasizes incentives that appeal to a person's cultural identity, which is less tangible than, for example a health plan. The PPD's goals and strategies are very similar

⁴ For a more detailed discussion see *Un Futuro para Todos, Puerto Rico mas Alla de sus Fronteras*, Programa de Acción del Partido Popular Democrático (PPD), Programa de Gobierno 1997-2000, 1997.

to the PNP's if one takes the desire for statehood out of the PNP equation or if one adds the statehood option to the PPD's equation. The only difference worth highlighting is the PPD's emphasis on fighting governmental corruption⁵.

The PIP advocates independence through democratic process with a transition period before full disfranchisement. The PIP also has roots in the autonomist movement. It evolved from *El Grito de Lares* in 1868 to the Puerto Rican Independent Party in 1948. The PIP divided its governmental program in two sections⁶. One section is devoted to environmental issues, and the other section is very similar to the PNP's and PPD's platforms. The PIP platform states

The Independent Puerto Rican Party reaffirm its historical commitment with decolonization, free determination, and the independence for Puerto Rico, with social justice and a better distribution of the economic resources, and services for our People, and with the objectives of honesty and efficiency in the government (PIP 1996, 1).

Its program focuses on governmental reform, economic development, social reform, health services, education and culture, and decolonization and independence. It is

⁵ An article in the Orlando Sentinel (September 21, 1997, H-5) directly related to this goal of the PPD. The article said that the leading Puerto Rican newspaper, *El Nuevo Dia*, assessed the current PNP's administration after 100 days (April 1997) and found it full of corruption. The reader should be aware that *El Nuevo Dia* is owned by the family of the PNP's founder. The reader also should know that the newspaper is run by the grandson and granddaughter of the founder of the PNP, Luis A. Ferré. They are Boston University communications graduates in their early thirties. In addition the current administration of the island canceled \$4.5 million worth of advertisement with *El Nuevo Dia* the day after it published the article about the first 100 days of the administration's performance. *El Nuevo Dia* remains the leading local newspaper and still takes the largest share of the approximately \$60 million a year of the government budget for advertisement.

⁶ For a detailed account of the PIP's program see *Programa del Partido Independentista Puertorriqueño para las Elecciones Generales de 1996*, and *Programa Ambiental del Partido Independentista Puertorriqueño para las Elecciones Generales de 1996*.

interesting to note that the party listed the previous goals in the index of its platform, the status definition is listed last. There is no fundamental difference between the previous political parties' platforms and the PIP's, if one takes the seeking of independence out of the PIP's equation and adds statehood or commonwealth options. However the PIP is emphasizing environmental protection in its program. Overall, the three main political parties advocate social justice. They are primarily concerned with amelioration of existing economic inequities and social injustices.

CHAPTER 3 STATUS ISSUE

Puerto Rico is a colony of the United States. Puerto Rico's main political parties advocate for changes in the political relationship with the United States, but none of them has been able to obtain an overwhelming majority of votes on the status issue. The commonwealth obtained a majority of votes in 1967; however, the results were not binding on the U.S. Congress.

I mentioned that several years after the Spanish American War, in 1917 Puerto Ricans were granted U.S. citizenship. I also mentioned that the constitution of Puerto Rico was approved by the U.S. congress after the people of Puerto Rico approved it through popular vote. This was one of the major steps taken by the PPD in the 1950s. The commonwealth constitution provided the people of Puerto Rico rights that were not part of the U.S. constitution at that time, for example equal rights for women, rights to elementary education, and workers' rights to strike. Throughout the years, the relationship between the mainland political parties and the local parties has developed. However, neither the granting of citizenship or the establishment of the commonwealth has solved the political status of the island.

The residents of Puerto Rico do not vote in U.S. presidential or congressional elections. They do vote in the major U.S. parties' primaries and provide support during the general election campaigns on the mainland. The Democratic Party and the Republican

Party have local representation on the island through both the PNP and PPD. The PIP apparently does not become involved with U.S. elections or campaigns. However, it does become involved in the political arena when policies are related to the political status of Puerto Rico. The traditional associations used to be Democrats with the Popular Democratic Party, and Republicans with the New Progressive Party. Moreover, traditional beliefs tended to be static and relied on a restricted hierarchical source of authority, that is, on the party leader. Now the PNP and PPD have established links with both Democrats and Republicans.

Both the PNP and PPD provide delegates to the Democrat and Republican national conventions. However, Puerto Rican political parties reflect ideological positions on the political status of the island, while the Democrat and Republican parties do not. Some people say that every election in Puerto Rico is in essence a plebiscite to define the political status of the island. The formulas in dispute during Spanish control (and under U.S. control) were known as liberalism, conservatism, and separatism. Liberalism meant more autonomy, that is less, government control. Conservatism's goal was to maintain stronger ties with the metropolis or statehood. Separatism was to break away completely from the metropolis's control and gain independence. Thus, one could say that the political status of Puerto Rico has been an issue for more than 500 years if one starts counting from the time that the indigenous population resisted the Spanish conquest.¹

¹ Many sources describe the first actual act of resistance by the native inhabitants of the island while under Spanish control. The sources state that the natives believed that the Spaniards were immortal gods.

The status question for Puerto Rico remains important for three reasons. First, there has not been overwhelming support for any of the political status options for Puerto Rico, and the independence option barely gets any votes. Second, the main political parties of the island continue to emphasize the status issue in their platforms. Third, the U.S. Congress has continued to discuss the issue of (re)defining the U.S.-Puerto Rican political relationship since 1898.

Puerto Rico has maintained a colonial relationship with the United States since 1898. However, the relationship has not been characterized by colonial neglect, as it was under Spain's 400 year relationship. U.S. military occupation of Puerto Rico ended officially in 1900 with the implementation of the Foraker Act, which provided for a local government, although only the lower house was open to local parties and politicians. Full local control of the house and senate came into effect in 1917 with the adoption of the Jones Act, which granted statutory citizenship to the people of Puerto Rico. Puerto Rico has had control of the local government since 1950 and a U.S.-approved local constitution since 1952. However, Puerto Rico's political status was not resolved by the granting of U.S. citizenship nor by the foundation of the commonwealth government. It continues to be a contentious issue among Puerto Ricans.

Puerto Rico cannot establish diplomatic relations with other countries without approval of the U.S. Congress. Heine (1986, 3) illustrates the degree of colonial condition prevalent in the past. He noted occasions in which Puerto Rico's department of education used translations from U.S. textbooks to teach Spanish on the island. Yet certain anomalies exist in the colonial status. Puerto Rico competes internationally as a separate

country in sports (Morris 1995). It is allowed to conduct limited free trade with Japan, mainly in the automobile industry. Puerto Rico applied for and was granted observer status in 1990 in the Caribbean Economic Community (CARICOM). It is an observer in the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. Puerto Rico is a lender nation, with the CARICOM approval, to the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB). Nevertheless, the status question remains alive in the local and national political agenda and is subject to periodic island-wide votes or plebiscites.

In this chapter, I will first discuss the status options presented to the registered voters of Puerto Rico in 1967 and 1993 and will review preliminary options to the proposed 1998 plebiscite. Second, I will briefly discuss the 1967 and 1993 plebiscites' results. Finally, I will analyze and discuss plebiscite results by comparing them to gubernatorial elections.

Status Options

There were three status options during the 1963 and 1993 plebiscites, none binding on the U.S. Congress. A fourth option, that of an associated republic, is included in the proposed 1998 plebiscite. Results of the proposed plebiscite would bind the U.S. Congress to act upon it if approved; however, the definitions are not final yet (105th Congress, H.R. 856, 1997).

Puerto Rican politicians write about the benefits and disadvantages of the status options in economic and political stability terms. For example, Miguel Hernandez Agosto, former president of the senate in Puerto Rico and a member of the PPD, favors the commonwealth option for economic reasons, but he also favors cultural identity (Falk

1986, 27). However, I have observed that most voters do not read political literature, and the political leadership has actively engaged in debating the status since 1940. Quiñones Calderon stated:

... Muñoz was convinced that the priority of his party should be, before the status issue, the serious social and economical conditions of the time. He decided that the status would not be an issue in the 1940 elections, inviting all Puerto Ricans of all political ideals to join the PPD (1984, 44).

It took another decade before any real consultation about the status was presented to the people of Puerto Rico (Quiñones Calderon 1984, 57), and almost another decade after that to hold the first plebiscite. It took almost 30 years after 1967 to consult the people about their status.

1967 Plebiscite Status Options Definitions

Puerto Ricans were to express their will over the final political status of Puerto Rico in the plebiscite held July 23, 1967. The options were statehood, commonwealth, and independence. A majority of votes in favor of any of the options meant a mandate from the people of Puerto Rico to its resident commissioner in Washington to act in accordance with the will of the people, but the vote was not binding on the U.S. Congress.

The 1967 status definitions stated:

"A vote in favor of the Commonwealth shall mean:

- (1) The reaffirmation of the Commonwealth established by mutual agreement under the terms of Act 600 of 1950 and joint resolution 447 of 1952 of the Congress of the United States as an autonomous community permanently associated with the United States of America;
- (2) The inviolability of common citizenship as the primary and indispensable basis of the permanent union between Puerto Rico and the United States;
- (3) The authorization to develop Commonwealth in accordance to its fundamental principles to a maximum of self government compatible with a common defense, a

common market, a common currency and the indissoluble link of the citizenship of the United States;

(4) That no change in the relations between the United States and Puerto Rico shall take effect unless previously approved by majority of the electors voting in a referendum held to that effect.

A vote in favor of Statehood shall mean:

The authorization to ask the Congress of the United States of America to admit Puerto Rico as federated state of the American Union.

A vote in favor of independence shall mean:

The authorization to ask the Congress for the independence of Puerto Rico from the United States of America." (Department of State of Puerto Rico 1967, 47-48)

1993 Plebiscite Status Option Definitions

The status plebiscite held in Puerto Rico on November 14, 1993, had the same options as the 1967 plebiscite. The status definitions were as follows²:

"A vote for Statehood is a mandate to claim the admittance of Puerto Rico as a State of the Union.

Statehood

- Is a non colonial status with political dignity.
- It will allow us the same rights, benefits, and responsibilities of the fifty states.
- It is the guaranteed permanent union, and the opportunity of economic and political progress.
- It is the permanent guarantee of all the rights that the United States Constitution grants including the preservation of our culture.
- It is the guaranteed permanent American citizenship, our two languages, anthems, and flags.
- It is the complete participation in all the federal programs.
- It is the right to vote for the President of the United States, and to elect no less than six representatives, and two Puerto Rican senators to the Congress.
- In the exercise of our rights as American citizens, we will negotiate the terms of such admission, which will be submitted to the people of Puerto Rico for ratification.

A vote for the commonwealth option is a mandate in favor of :

- To guarantee the progress and security of our children, within a status of political dignity, based in the permanent between Puerto Rico and the United States, consecrated in a bilateral pact that can not be altered without mutual consent.

² The source for the definitions for the 1993 plebiscite is Puerto Rico's State Electoral Commission. They were found at the Internet site, Elections in Puerto Rico, <http://info.pitt.edu/~alvarez/elections/pr/plebiscito93/html>.

The commonwealth guarantees:

- Irrevocable U.S. citizenship;
- A common market, currency, and defense with the U.S.;
- Fiscal autonomy for Puerto Rico;
- A Puerto Rican Olympic committee and our own international sports representation.
- Complete development of our cultural identity: with the Commonwealth we are Puerto Rican first.

We will develop the Commonwealth through specific proposals to the Congress.

We will immediately propose:

- Reformulation of section 936, ensuring the creation of more and better jobs;
- Extension of Complementary Social Security (SSI) to Puerto Rico;
- Acquisition of equal nutritional assistance entitlements as the states;
- Protection of other agricultural products, besides coffee.

Any additional change will be submitted to the people of Puerto Rico for approval. Independence is the right of our people to rule on our land; it is the enjoyment of all the powers and attributes of sovereignty.

-In the exercise of that inalienable and not relinquish right, Puerto Rico will be governed by a constitution that will establish a democratic government, protect human rights, and assert our nationality and language.

Independence will provide Puerto Rico the necessary powers to reach greater development, and prosperity, including the powers to protect and stimulate our industries, agriculture, and trade, control immigration, and negotiate international agreements that could expand the market, and promote investments of other countries.

-A Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the United States and a transition process to independence in accordance with the legislation approved by the House, and the pertinent committees of the federal Senate will provide for: the continuation of already obtained Social Security benefits, veterans and others; Puerto Rican and U.S. citizenship for those who want to keep it; the right to use our own currency or the U.S. dollar; free access to U.S. markets, tax break incentives for North-American companies; the continuation of current levels of federal aid for ten years, and the eventual demilitarization of the country."

One can see that the independence and statehood status definitions were amplified in the 1993 plebiscite. The statehood definition in 1967 was not a definition. It was a request to pursue a permanent union as a federated state with the United States and it did not include any characterization of what statehood status would encompass. One can

assume that the collective conscience of the statehood promoters was not consolidated in 1967, as stated by Quiñones Calderón:

The Statehood Republican Party, that has been represented in the bosom of the commission by Garcia Méndez and Luis A. Ferré, decided to boycott the legislative work for the approval of the plebiscite law, as well as the consultation to the voters, scheduled for July 23, 1967. Ferré decided to defend the statehood option in the plebiscite, founding the non-party organization Estadistas Unidos, which he used in the plebiscite (1984, 72).

It was as if they were only appealing to their rank and file loyalty and did not think about convincing the rest of the voters. It appeared that they thought of themselves as an overwhelming majority, or they realized that they did not have any other choice. Therefore, they did not try to justify why statehood was the right option for all voters in 1967.

However, in 1993, the statehood option language was characterized by rights and responsibilities. Moreover, the definition in 1993 included a characterization of what statehood would encompass, if approved by the people of Puerto Rico and by the U.S. Congress. The voters were made aware that under the statehood option they were not going to renounce their cultural heritage. The statehood promoters ensured that the definition to be presented in the 1993 plebiscite had more substance than in 1967, focusing on tangible as well as intangible incentives. The statehood supporters recognized cultural feelings by reassuring the voters that they were not going to forfeit their culture. Moreover, Puerto Ricans were to permanently maintain the anthem and flag of both Puerto Rico and the United States. Statehood was to bring Puerto Ricans to the same level of responsibility, rights, and privileges as other U.S. citizens living in the fifty states.

The independence status option supporters clarified and defined independence, in 1993, as the right for self government. The independence supporters appealed to nationalism in the 1993 plebiscite language. In contrast, they essentially appealed to nothing in 1967. The 1993 language was not an anti-American nationalist appeal but rather a call for self government in domestic and foreign matters. In addition, they proposed a possible treaty with the United States while transitioning to independence. They appealed to the rationality of the voters by using, as part of their rhetoric, additional incentives. That is, they proposed the continuation of U.S. federal aid for ten years after independence and the continuation of the acquired benefits such as Social Security and veterans, entitlements. Even though they appealed to rational incentives, such as expansion of the trade market and an increase in investments, they failed, I believe, to properly address security issues. That is, they proposed the eventual demilitarization of the island. They brought about the security issue of respect to human rights but did not mention national self defense measures. Rather, they simply called for demilitarization of the country.

Although the statehood and independence definitions were articulated better in the 1993 plebiscite in contrast to the one in 1967, the same cannot be said about the commonwealth definition. The supporters of the commonwealth did not define the commonwealth status. Rather, they provided a characterization of the commonwealth status on both occasions. They appealed to the rational person when presenting their arguments. Among the appeals they made in the 1967 plebiscite were Puerto Rican culture, U.S. citizenship, and security based on the common defense with the United

States. In 1993, they used the previous incentives plus the enticement of Olympic and international sports representation. They continued to appeal to federal aid incentives such as equal entitlements in the nutritional assistance program and complementary Social Security (SSI). In summary, the definitions used in the 1967 plebiscite were vague, particularly the statehood and independence status definitions. Supporters of all the options failed to provide definitions of their status formulas. However, the commonwealth definition in 1967 appealed to economic and political stability and cultural identity and used several incentives to persuade all the eligible voters that the commonwealth option was the right one. The other two options, statehood and independence, relied on the loyalty of rank and file in 1967. It appears as if their advocates were not trying to convince all the voters and thought that they were mustering an overwhelming majority within their ranks. All options were better-articulated in 1993, although the commonwealth supporters did not expand their definition extensively. The essence of the statehood status definition was in the acquisition of the same responsibilities, rights, and privileges of the citizens in the fifty states of the union. The independence status relied on acquiring sovereignty for

Plebiscite Results

1967 Plebiscite

Table 2.1
1967 Plebiscite

Year	Statehood	Commonwealth	Independence
1967	274,312 (39%)	425,132 (60.4%)	4,248 (0.6%)

Source: Puerto Rico State Electoral Commission

Puerto Rico. Finally, the commonwealth status relied on maintaining the status quo while attempting to increase and expand participation of federal assistance.

The status plebiscite held in Puerto Rico on July 23, 1967, produced a majority vote in favor of the commonwealth option (table 2.1). The commonwealth option won all eight senatorial districts and three of the capital's five house districts, albeit in one of these, the margin over statehood was only 60 votes or 0.4 percent. Of the island's 77 municipalities (now 78), 73 voted for commonwealth and 4 for statehood.

Since the commonwealth option won in 1967, one would have expected that the party that supported the commonwealth would have won the 1968 general elections. However, the results of the 1968 election produced a majority win for the New Progressive Party (PNP), which supported statehood. Moreover, the elections of 1968 ended political domination of the Popular Democratic Party (PPD), which support the commonwealth.

1993 Plebiscite

Table 2.2
1993 Plebiscite

Year	Statehood	Commonwealth	Independence
1993	788,296 (46.3%)	826,326 (48.6%)	75,620 (4.4%)

Source: Puerto Rico State Electoral Commission

The commonwealth alternative won the status plebiscite held in Puerto Rico on November, 14, 1993. The commonwealth status won a relative majority of the votes cast

in the electoral event, but it was a reduced margin of victory when compared to 1967 (tables 2.1 and 2.2). Commonwealth won a majority of 38,030 votes or 2.3 percent over the next contender, statehood. Of the 2,312,912 registered voters, 1,700,990 cast ballots, for a turnout of 73.5 percent. The commonwealth option won in five of the eight senatorial districts, with statehood winning in the remaining three. However, statehood won one senate district by only 0.45 percent. Likewise, the commonwealth won in 24 of 40 house of representatives districts, as opposed to 16 that voted for statehood. All of San Juan's, five house districts voted for statehood; however, in one of these, commonwealth lost to statehood by a margin of 58 votes or 0.16 percent. The commonwealth won 55 of the 78 municipalities, as opposed to 23 for statehood. By comparison, in the 1992 general elections, the PNP, which supports statehood for Puerto Rico, won 914,000 votes or 50.3 percent. The PPD, which supports commonwealth status received 829,057 votes or 45.6 percent. The PIP, which advocates the separation of the island from the United States, garnished 75,166 votes or 4.1 percent. In this 1992 election, the PNP won 54 municipalities against 24 for the PPD. For the neophyte of Puerto Rican politics, the previous pictures (1967 plebiscite versus 1968 general election and 1993 plebiscite versus 1992 general elections) may seem an anomaly; however, one must remember that the people of Puerto Rico are acting in a rational manner. That is, people conduct cost and benefit analysis prior to making a decision.

1998 Plebiscite Status Options Definitions

The U.S. Congress is considering the possibility of holding a binding plebiscite in 1998 on the status issue. The bill (HR 856), "United States-Puerto Rico Political Status

Act," was approved by the House Resources Committee in May 1997 with bipartisan support. The prime sponsor of H.R. 856 is U.S. Representative Don Young, Republican from Arkansas. His cosponsor is U.S. representative George Miller, Democrat from California. The final version of this bill is expected to reach the U.S. House of Representatives by early 1998. It would allow the people of Puerto Rico to decide the future status of the island by December 31, 1998, by choosing statehood, separate sovereignty, or commonwealth. H.R. 856 defines the status formulas as follows:

Statehood: Puerto Rico would become a fully self governing state through statehood, in which the people of Puerto Rico are fully self governing and their rights are secured by the U.S. Constitution. The U.S. Constitution, laws, and treaties would apply fully in Puerto Rico, and the constitution is the supreme law as it is in the other states of the union. Moreover, Puerto Rico would become permanently linked with the United States. In addition, any authority not delegated to the United States by the constitution nor prohibited by the constitution to the states are reserved to the State of Puerto Rico. In like manner, U.S. citizenship is guaranteed and protected in the same way as in the other fifty states. The people of Puerto Rico would have equal rights, privileges, immunities, and benefits as well as equal duties and responsibilities including Federal taxes, as those in other states. U.S. citizens in Puerto Rico would be able to vote in the election of the president and vice president and be represented in congress with two senators and number of representatives in proportion to the state's population. The definition also proposed that English be the official language in the federal courts and agencies, as it is by law in all the other states. In addition, it encourages the expansion of English as the official language of

the state government, courts, and agencies. The definition for statehood maintains the essence of the 1993 language.

The commonwealth definition has been an issue of controversy of local and national political debate because its previous essence would change in 1998.

Commonwealth: The definition for the commonwealth formula, as stated in H. R. 856, is that Puerto Rico is joined in a relationship under the national sovereignty of the United States. This relationship cannot be dissolved without mutual consent. Under this relationship, Puerto Rico, like a state, is an autonomous political entity, sovereign over matters not ruled by the U.S. Constitution. Moreover, the laws of the commonwealth will govern Puerto Rico as long as they are consistent with the constitution, treaties, and laws of the United States. Furthermore, the U.S. Congress reserves the constitutional authority to enact laws pertinent to Puerto Rico. People born in Puerto Rico have statutory citizenship. That is, citizenship under the commonwealth is not guaranteed and secured as is the citizenship of the fifty states. The rights, privileges, and immunities provided by the U.S. Constitution to the citizens apply in Puerto Rico, as long as they are not restricted to apply only within the fifty states; certain rights, privileges, and immunities apply only in the fifty states. In like manner, Puerto Rico would continue to partake in federal programs, and this participation could be on equal terms contingent on the payment of contributions, such as taxes, in accordance to federal law.

Independence: The separate sovereignty status definition, in the proposed 1998 plebiscite, provides for independence or free association as two distinct options under the same umbrella. Within the definition, Puerto Rico is a sovereign republic that has full

responsibility and authority over its territory and population. Consequently, it would have a constitution that is the supreme law that would provide for a republican form of government and the protection of human rights. Moreover, Puerto Rico would become a recognized nation in the international community with full responsibility for its fiscal and monetary policy, immigration, trade, and international relations. Hence, the people of Puerto Rico would owe allegiance and have nationality and citizenship of the Republic of Puerto Rico. U.S. sovereignty in Puerto Rico would end and U.S. constitution and laws no longer apply in Puerto Rico. Likewise, U.S. citizenship and nationality no longer would be granted by birth in Puerto Rico or by relationship to persons with statutory citizenship by birth in Puerto Rico. Nevertheless, persons who had such U.S. citizenship would have a statutory right to keep U.S. nationality and citizenship for life based on continued allegiance to the United States and as long as they do not maintain allegiance to other sovereign nations, including Puerto Rico. The United States would honor previous rights of individuals in Puerto Rico based upon past services or contributions in accordance with federal law. To develop a friendly and cooperative relationship, the United States and Puerto Rico would establish treaties to deal with matters of mutual interest, such as economic and programmed assistance granted on a government-to-government basis, trade between territories, transit of citizens in accordance to immigration laws, and status of U.S. military forces.

HR 856 describes free-association within the independence definition language. A free-association would include the previous demition and characterization of a sovereign nation. Although free association includes the characteristic of a sovereign nation, it

encompasses the delegation of some governmental functions and other cooperative arrangements as agreed to by both parties. The arrangements would be conducted under a bilateral pact that could be eliminated at will by either the United States or Puerto Rico. The definition does not list examples of which governmental functions or cooperative arrangements could be included in the bilateral pact.

All three options including the variation of independence as free-association for 1998 are similar to the 1993 characterizations. At the same time there are significant differences. First, the commonwealth definition in 1993 did not state that U.S. citizenship in Puerto Rico has certain restrictions, while the 1998 proposal makes clear that certain rights, privileges, and immunities provided by U.S. citizenship could apply only in the fifty states. Consequently, to participate in federal programs on an equal basis would require additional responsibilities, such as the payment of federal taxes. The 1993 commonwealth definition did not specify that the U.S. Congress would have the right to enact laws it deems necessary relating to Puerto Rico, while the 1998 definition did. Second, the independence option in 1993 did not leave a door open for the possibility of temporarily sharing governmental responsibilities, while the 1998 option does within the associated republic proposal. Furthermore, the independence proposal of 1993, in contrast to 1998, did not carry the weight of being recognized internationally as a sovereign nation. The 1993 proposal, when contrasted with the 1998, did not include that English would be the official language for all federal agencies and not only for the federal court. English is the official language used in the U.S. federal court in Puerto Rico.

In summary, the 1998 status proposals expand and clarify the scope of definitions used in the plebiscite of 1993. The 1998 proposals appeal to political stability and economic issues rather than such issues as cultural preservation or international sports representation. The essence of the statehood proposal continues to be characterized by aspiration for equality with the fifty states, much like in the 1993 plebiscite. The 1998 commonwealth option was presented without cosmetic incentives such as preservation of culture or international representation in sports. The 1998 definition makes clear that congressional laws could be enacted that would apply only to Puerto Rico and that some laws apply to the fifty states but not to Puerto Rico. Moreover, the current status would not be a permanent relationship as was expressed in the 1993 and 1967 proposals, a change that has generated controversy about the commonwealth definition at the local and federal levels. The independence option retains the definition of sovereignty that it did in 1993 and thus is the option that carries the least change. The main difference is the introduction of the associated republic option within the definition of separate sovereignty in 1998.

Analysis and Discussion

Elections in Puerto Rico could be divided into two periods. One was the period under Spanish control from 1808 to 1898, and the other period is under U.S. control from 1900 to the present. I will concentrate my discussion of the period starting in 1948 to the present because 1948 was the year that the people of Puerto Rico were authorized for the first time to elect their governor. Moreover, it marked almost a decade of PPD hegemony in the island's political agenda.

Table 2.3 presents the gubernatorial results from 1948 to 1996. The winning party is underlined. The PNP did not become an official political party until 1968. Other lesser political parties are grouped by their ideology, that is, in parenthesis under the principal political party.

One can see by looking at the gubernatorial results that the trend from 1950 until 1976 was pro-commonwealth. The domination by the PPD in Puerto Rico ended in 1968 because of internal rivalries (Morales Carrión, 1990, 76). This conflict resulted in the creation of a new liberal party in 1968 by Roberto Sanchez Vilella. He named it the People's Party (*Partido del Pueblo*). Sanchez Vilella's new party caused a division of loyalties within the PPD. Muñoz Marin selected Sanchez Vilella to be his successor in 1964. Muñoz Marin could have continued to be elected governor for a few more terms, but he declined to continue the *candillismo* tradition prevalent in most of Latin America. Sanchez Vilella served only one term, before suffering a sound defeat by the PNP in 1968. That was the end of the People's Party. Until 1968, proponents of the commonwealth had never suffered a defeat in the elections.

The PNP winner of the 1968 elections was Luis A. Ferré. In 1972, the PPD reunited and achieved victory under the leadership of Rafael Hernández Colón, with slightly more than 50 percent of the votes. It lost in 1976 to Carlos Romero Barceló of the PNP. No incumbent was reelected from 1968 to 1980. Another change of preferences occurred in 1984 with Rafael Hernández Colón of the PPD winning again until 1992. In 1992, the PNP won the elections under the leadership of Pedro Roselló, the current governor.

Table 2.3
Puerto Rico's Gubernatorial Election Results from 1948 to 1996

Year	PNP	PPD	PIP
1948	(Statehood) (153,837=24.1%)	(Commonwealth) <u>392,386 (61.2%)</u> (29,140=4.5)	(Independence) 65,351 (10.2%)
1952	 (107,310=16.1%)	<u>431,409 (64.9%)</u>	126,228 (19.0%)
1956	 (174,683=25.1%)	<u>435,255 (62.5%)</u>	86,636 (12.4%)
1960	 (312,517=38.7%)	<u>459,759 (58.2%)</u>	24,211 (3.1%)
1964	 (315,580=38.0%)	<u>492,571 (59.2%)</u>	23,340 (3.3%)
1968	<u>400,815 (43.6%)</u> (4,449=0.5%)	374,040 (40.7%) (107,359=11.7%)	32,166 (3.5%)
1972	563,609 (43.4%)	<u>658,856 (50.7%)</u> (4,007=0.3%)	69,654 (5.4%) (3,758=0.2%)
1976	<u>703,968 (48.3%)</u>	660,401 (45.3%)	83,037 (5.7%) (10,728=0.7%)
1980	<u>759,926 (47.2%)</u>	756,889 (47.0%)	87,272 (5.4%) (5,224 (0.3%)
1984	768,959 (44.6) (69,807=4.1%)	<u>822,709 (47.8%)</u>	61,312 (3.2%)
1988	820,342 (45.8%)	<u>871,858 (48.7%)</u>	99,206 (5.5%)
1992	<u>938,969 (49.9%)</u>	862,989 (45.9%)	79,219 (4.2%)
1996	<u>1,006,331 (51.1%)</u>	875,852 (44.5%)	75,304 (3.8%)

Source: Puerto Rico State Electoral Commission

When the 1967 and 1993 plebiscite results are compared, one can see that the trend toward statehood is growing, while the preference for commonwealth is declining. The preference for separatism has remained approximately the same. Comparing the 1992 elections with the plebiscite results, one could have thought that the statehood option would win, but it did not. However, the gap between status quo and statehood preference is only slightly more than 2 percent. The preferences are approximately split in half today. One also should notice that in the 1996 election, the PNP surpassed one million voters, another indicator that the ideological trend is moving toward statehood. Another trend worth noting is the "melon" syndrome. Melons are green on the outside and red on the inside. The PPD color is red, and the PIP color is green, and PNP color is blue. In popular terms, people who exercise a strategic vote claiming to be pro-independence (PIP) but vote pro commonwealth (PPD) to stop the statehood (PNP) advancement are called "melons" (see 1984 and 1996 results).

The proposed 1998 plebiscite carries the additional weight of binding the U.S. Congress to act upon the winning option. The definitions or characterizations for 1998 do not appeal through such incentives as cultural preservation or international sports representation. Although one can see the shift in preference toward statehood in the plebiscite of 1993 and in the general elections since 1976, one cannot determine why there is such a change. That is, party preferences in general elections do not equate to status preference and vice versa. Therefore, the incentives offered or not offered are more salient in people's mind during plebiscites and elections than simply loyalty to a political party. I

will analyze the reasons, why the people of Puerto Rico are shifting their preference toward the statehood option in the next chapter using a case study.

CHAPTER 4

CASE STUDY: HUMACAO

In this chapter, I will present evidence in support of the argument that the people of Puerto Rico are shifting toward the statehood preference because of fear of economic decline, and authoritarian type of government, like Latin America if U.S. protection is terminated. First, I explain why I chose the city of Humacao to be the case study. Second, I present a profile and brief history of Humacao. Finally, I discuss and analyze the interviews conducted at the city of Humacao in the summer of 1997.

Why Humacao?

I chose Humacao as the case study because it parallels Puerto Rico's overall development in several important ways. First, Humacao developed mostly under autonomist, later PPD, leadership until 1992. Puerto Rico also was under autonomist leadership for most of the period (table 2.3). Today, Puerto Rico and Humacao are under PNP (statehood) leadership. Second, Humacao and Puerto Rico depended almost exclusively on agriculture until about the beginning of the twentieth century. With the implementation of Operation Bootstrap in the late 1940s, their economies shifted toward the industrial-manufacturing sector. Currently, the industrial sector is based mostly on pharmaceuticals, textiles, and advanced technological industries. Third, the parallelism of Puerto Rico and Humacao are not only in economic development and political party preference but also on the political status preference. Although in 1993 Humacao's voter's

preference for commonwealth was significantly higher than the island. In 1967, as Humacao electors voted 28.1 percent in favor of the statehood option, while 71.6 percent voted for the commonwealth (autonomy) option (Puerto Rico State Electoral Commission 1997). This approximately 30 percent difference in votes was equivalent to the island's results in 1967 (see table 2.1). Furthermore, in 1993, the city's percentage of electors preferring statehood was 39.3, compared to 56 percent preferring the commonwealth. This was a difference of roughly 17 percent between the two majority options, commonwealth and statehood. The statehood preference increased, while the commonwealth preference decreased (see tables 2.1 and 2.2). Therefore, Humacao can serve as a good case study to illustrate my argument, taking into consideration the points highlighted.

Humacao: Profile and History

Humacao is a medium-size city located in the east coast of Puerto Rico. It is delimited on the north by the city of Naguabo, by the city of Yabucoa on the south, by the city of Las Piedras to the west, and by the Passage of Vieques (Caribbean Sea) to the east. The territories bordering Las Piedras were famous for their agricultural productivity. The Yabucoa and Las Piedras border territories are elevated terrain. The heart of the city is located in a valley, limited by high terrain in all directions except to the east¹. Humacao covers 54.84 square miles or 88.25 kilometers subdivided into 13 *barrios* or sectors.

¹ The highest elevation in the island is 4,389 feet (1,388 meters) at Cerro Punta in the interior of the island.

Humacao had a population of 55,203, according to the 1990 census. The per capita income that year was \$3,955. There were 46 factories in the manufacturing sector, employing more than 4,000 people and producing a variety of items, from clothing to pacemakers. Currently, the principal industries are Bristol Myers, Ex-Lax, Syntec, Med-Tronic, General Electric, Reedco, Color-Con, Alcon, Myles, and Tonka. The construction industry employed 1,319 people. Total city unemployment was 14.2 percent.

Some people claim that Humacao was under native rule until about 1515, making it the last bastion under Taino control (Abreu 1984). Its name derived from the name of the native chief of the area, Jumacao, at the time of the Spanish conquest. The Spanish did not organize any official settlement in the Humacao area until the beginning of the eighteen century. The first Spanish settlement in the area was named San Luis del Principe de las Riberas del Jumacao, settled in 1721 . It had an area with fertile soil and was close to the sea. The valley was very humid, and it was excellent for pastures to raise cattle. The first official settlers came from the Canary Islands sponsored by the Spanish crown (Gil-Bermejo 1964). A small number of ranchers who already had monopolized the land in the valley perceived the newcomers as a threat to their cattle-raising activity. The official settlers came to till the land. They were in constant conflict with the ranchers until the farmers fled into the higher terrain (Abreu 1984, 54 and 60). The ranchers were more powerful and eventually took control of the valley. Nevertheless, the settlement slowly evolved with both ranchers and the farmers together.

Humacao has been the seat of electoral district since 1879 and declared a city in 1894. Humacao's original electoral district was composed of eight municipalities; today it

has fifteen. Humacao remained under Spanish control until September 22, 1898, when U.S. troops officially took over the city. The transition was peaceful, though sad for some of the locals (Saez 1967, 132-33).

The former city administrators hoped that the relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States would not be based only on military occupation but rather on cooperation. This hope is reflected in the act of the transition:

. . . We offer then, to the constituted government our loyalty, and the people hope, mister Captain, that the military organization, which was imposed upon us, is not the only tie that join us to the great American nation; we hope in heaven that we can be united in the currents of progress and liberty, which you offer to us, and that we accept it in exchange for our kindness and our good conduct (Humacao Municipal Act, September 22, 1898).

A local civilian government was instituted at the end of 1899, characterized by parliamentary laws.

Humacao developed slowly through the years. Its agriculturally based economy started to erode in the 1930s and its first industry was established in 1932. This was a textile industry, that produced hand-made and machine-made items. The introduction of new factories started to take away land formerly dedicated to sugarcane fields or cattle-grazing. The first established industry in Humacao promoted under Operation Bootstrap was Textron Caribe, in 1949 (Abreu 1984, 198-99).

Operation Bootstrap, the name Muñoz Marin gave to the industrialization program was a model implemented by the government of Puerto Rico in the late 1940s. The political party in control of the government during Operation Bootstrap was the PPD. The program's essence was granting tax breaks to new industries in the island to decrease the

island's dependency on federal programs and make it more self sufficient. Initially the program was a success that lasted until the early 1970s. Norris describes the operation:

In every field, the island was humming. Aged local aqueducts gave way to an island-wide water system. Power lines stretched to the kerosene lamp communities in the hills. The 8,000 poles that carried the lines were installed by helicopters hovering over the steep slopes - a new technique that Puerto Ricans were proud to pass on to engineers in the States (1968, 117).

Operation Bootstrap was an economic model of "industrialization by invitation" of U.S. capital. Its initial success was based on tax incentives granted to investors for industrial development. The economy grew at the rate of 7.6% in 1950 and continued to maintain steady growth reaching, 9.7% in 1970; in contrast, Puerto Rico's economic growth ranged between 1.3% and 2.2% after 1990 (Gautier 1994, 161-65).

On or about 1950, the government created laws that provided tax breaks for U.S. industries such as a ten-year tax break for new industries. Low wages provided an additional incentive. These opened the doors for industrialization in Puerto Rico and in turn in Humacao. This strategy remained in effect until the mid-1970s when it was replaced with Section 936 of the U.S. Internal Revenue tax code. The most important industries were pharmaceuticals, electronics, textiles, petrochemicals, and processed foods, while dairy production and livestock products are the main source of income in the agricultural sector. However, tourism is another important contributor to the local economy. The sugar industry was and is in decline, as one can observe with the disappearance of the sugarcane fields. The industrialization period caused several changes in the lives of the people of Puerto Rico and Humacao which in turn affected people's political preferences.

Beginning with the 1950s, Humacao experienced other changes, such as the emergence of private secondary and elementary schools, a small airport, tourist centers, private and public universities, major highways, a radio station, an increase in urban housing construction, a public library, and a local newspaper. The central government constructed several buildings in Humacao for the industries. The first one was built in 1952 and occupied by Textron Caribe until 1960, when that company closed operations. Women were incorporated into the industrial labor force after 1950, making up to 32 percent of the Puerto Rican working population by 1960 (Silvestrini 1989). Women did not abandon their important traditional roles of administering the households and being spouses and mothers. Women enhanced their educational skills and surpassed men in education. In 1995, women's educational level in Puerto Rico was 13.4 years of schooling, while men attained was 12.5 years². For Humacao in 1990, the levels were 9.7 years for men and 9.6 for women. Women's importance in the economic development of Humacao and the island cannot be emphasized enough. However, they have not been immune to unemployment³.

Another change was that people left the rural areas and moved to the cities near the industrial zones (Safa 1989, 21). The central government established Foreign Trade Zone (FTZ) No 7 in Mayaguez in 1961. It has 17 manufacturing and warehousing

² Statistic taken from *Participacion de la Mujer en la Fuerza Laboral 1995*, Departamento del Trabajo y Recursos Humanos Negociado de Estadisticas del Trabajo, Puerto Rico, p. 2-5.

³ I remember my neighbor complaining in 1970 that she lost her job because the factory closed down after the ten-year tax break ended, a frequent occurrence I heard the latter a lot during the middle and late 1970s.

Table 3.1
Economic and Social Progress Indicators

Year	Socioeconomic Indicator	Amount	Rank/Standing
1994	Gross Domestic Product (GDP)	\$39,536,000,000	8
1994	GDP per capita	\$10,820	2
1994	Trade-Exports of Goods and Services	\$21,753,000,000	4
1994	Trade-Imports of Goods and Services	\$16,654,000,000	4
1994	Percentage Change in Consumer Prices	3.0	23
1994	Population	3,486,000	17

Source: Inter American Development Bank

Bootstrap became stagnant, its concept did not. That is, its essence turned into a new form of incentive created by the federal government.

In the early 1970s Operation Bootstrap evolved into Section 936 of the Federal Internal Revenue Service (IRS). This section, which the U.S. congress eliminated in 1996 and would be phased out in 2006, provided a lucrative haven for the 130-plus transnational U.S. companies. They could deposit their profits into banks in Puerto Rico for at least six months and then repatriate these deposits and interests gained tax-free to the mainland. They did have to pay a 10-percent tax on their profits to Puerto Rico, later lowered to about 4 percent (Gautier 1994, 165).

Federal expenses account for about 30 percent of Puerto Rico's GNP. These funds are combined with local revenues and used to expand and maintain the islands infrastructure, such as roads, utilities, and other public services. Other public services

include maintaining a minimum quality of life in terms of nutrition, health, and education.

The funds also are used to maintain the infrastructure of federal civil and military facilities.

Gautier describes an elite sector that benefits from these federal funds:

Under this situation, the Puerto Rican upper classes are unique in Latin America: they enjoy the benefits of partnership with U.S. capital without having to pay the cost in any significant way; they do not pay federal taxes and they make use of federal funds to make economic concessions to the working classes and the marginal sectors without affecting their profit margins (1994, 160).

Humacao had the same political tendencies and preferences as the island; some supported decentralization and local political participation, in the island's government, and some sought complete integration, statehood, with the metropolis. Today, autonomy is under the umbrella of the PPD, supporters of the commonwealth, and integration under the PNP, supporters of statehood.

The autonomists, later the PPD, held control of the municipality of Humacao until about 1926, then control alternated between them and the opposition until 1944. The PPD again controlled the municipality from 1944 to 1992. The PNP currently controls the municipality since winning the elections of 1992 and 1996.

The desire for progress and freedom expressed in the official act of the transition between the local administration and the U.S. military, almost 100 years ago, has not disappeared. Luis Guevara, a Humacao resident, sent a letter to *Humacao*, a local magazine, that captures that same feeling of 100 years ago:

My mind and reason turned into a storm, because, on the one hand, traditionally my family and I had been members of a political philosophy different from the one that had transformed the city, but, on the other hand, I thought that this was the opportunity that for many years we, *Humacaenos*, had waited for.

The transformation of Humacao, the opportunity to grow in an orderly and clean community, makes me take a drastic decision in my life: to cross party lines.

For this reason, I encourage you, young one, to look around and see, as I and my family did, the true change that was realized by the current incumbent . . . (1996, 11).

The shift in political preferences is not something that a person will do from one day to the next. It is a slow process, as evidenced in Guevara's letter and in what the city administrators stated a century ago. The reader will be able to appreciate that the shift in preferences has been based on economic and political stability; that is, the people of Humacao, like the rest of Puerto Rico, experienced a radical change in sovereignty and economic development at the turn of the century. The next section presents the case study highlighting some factors that influenced the decisions of the people of Humacao regarding the political status of Puerto Rico.

Analysis and Discussion

The study is based on interviews with local voters. In selecting those to be interviewed, I attempted to maintain a balance between gender, age, and residential area. The interviews were conducted in a conversational format using pre-selected questions (appendix C). I picked every second house in different sectors of the city to ensure that middle-, lower-, and upper-income persons were included in the sample, as well as urban and rural dwellers. However, the highest income sector is missing from the sample because time and resources precluded interviews with those residing in the wealthiest sector of the city.

The case study's sample is composed of 120 people and divided into three age groups: older than 51 years, 22 to 51 years, and 17 to 21 years. These three age groups

provided information on the thinking of three different generations related to the political status of Puerto Rico. The youngest person was 17 and the oldest 88. However, 50 percent of the sample is over 51 years of age, that is, people who voted in the 1967 and 1993 plebiscites. The sample includes people who voted in the 1993 plebiscite but not in 1967 and people who did not vote in either plebiscite.

There were 63 females and 57 males. I maintained a relatively equal balance between rural and urban residents, with 45 percent of the cases living in the rural area and 55 percent living in the urban area. The mean education was eleventh grade. The highest education level was a doctorate and the lowest was no formal education; 71 percent of the sample was at or above the high school level. The mean yearly income was \$7,526 including a maximum of \$42,000 and a minimum of no income. That mean is almost double the \$3,995 Humacao's city government reported for 1990.

I used a statistic software program (SPSS version 7.5) to work with the data. The unit of analysis is at the individual level of the average Puerto Rican voter, taking into consideration the three different age groups. I compared responses for two years, 1967 and 1993, and I included possible responses for the potential plebiscite of 1998. Thus, the spatial temporal domain is the outcome of the 1967 and 1993 plebiscites. I am trying to account for the shift toward statehood preference between the 1967 and 1993 plebiscites. I also compared the plebiscites results with the responses for 1998.

I used three predictors to account for the variation in outcomes between the 1967 and 1993 plebiscites and the projected 1998 outcome. The predictors are, political instability, economic decline, and cultural identity. These predictors were composed of

three variables each, for a total of nine variables (appendix B) used to define the predictors. Political instability was defined by political stability of the island, fear of the emergence of a dictatorship, and retention of U.S. citizenship. Economic decline was defined by improvement in individual economic situation, fear of decrease in the per capita income when compared to other Latin American countries, and living conditions of neighboring islands and other Latin American countries. Finally, cultural identity was defined by fear of losing the culture, fear of losing the international sports status, and family tradition. The interviewed people answered to whether they voted for their particular option based on the influence of these variables. I use the average of the three set of variables to record the data in tables 3.2 to 3.4, 3.7 to 3.9, 3.13 to 3.15, and 3.17. My argument is that the voters of Puerto Rico are shifting their status preference toward statehood because of fear of economic decline and political instability, as other Latin American countries have experienced if Puerto Rico's ties to the United States are not guaranteed. Cultural identity explains why the shift in preference is occurring at a relatively slow pace.

The decade prior to 1967 was a time of economic boom as a result of the implementation of Operation Bootstrap and because of federal fund transfers. It also was a decade of political tranquility, mainly as a result of the hegemonic PPD's control of the island political agenda and distribution of federal funds. Puerto Rico experienced an increase in education levels, land reform, and other improvements in the duality of life under the leadership of commonwealth supporters. Therefore, the majority of the people living under this relatively abundant life style (compared to previous years of poverty

level) did not hesitate to support the commonwealth status option; they determined that under the commonwealth they could continue to obtain economic improvement and political stability and maintain their cultural identity.

The voters' average percent selection for their particular preference based on political stability was 50.5 (table 3.2). These voters thought that their status preference was going to provide or maintain the political stability of the island in 1967. Forty percent did not think about political instability while making their decisions. Fifty percent of the interviewed voters chose the commonwealth in 1967 option, and 23.3% chose the statehood option (table 3.5); 25% of the interviewed voters did not vote in 1967. Abstentions were not included in the official report of the 1967 plebiscite. The official results, posted by Puerto Rico's Electoral Commission, for Humacao were 71.6% for the commonwealth, 28% for statehood, and 0.4% for independence.

The results of the interviews for the 1993 plebiscite indicate that 70.4% of voters determined that their particular status preference would provide or maintain political stability in the island (table 3.3). That time, 54% of the sample voters chose commonwealth, while 36.7% opted for statehood (table 3.7). This represented an overall 4% gain for the commonwealth, and 13.4% increase for the statehood option. The independence option received slightly over 1%. The official results were 39.3% for statehood, 56% for the commonwealth, 3.9% for independence, and 0.8% of void (cast) ballots. One can see by comparing tables 3.2 and 3.3 that the shift toward statehood based on political instability increased in 1993; there was an 11.7% increase in support of statehood versus a 6.7% increase for commonwealth (see Table 3.5). Abstention dropped

over 18 percent and there was no change for independence between 1967 and 1993 plebiscites in the 51 and over year group (see table 3.5). That represents an almost 50 percent gain for statehood over the commonwealth option within the 51 and over year group. Moreover, there was an 8.3 percent of commonwealth supporters that shifted from statehood to commonwealth. The total shift between 1967 and 1993 was 16.7 percent toward statehood, and 13.3 toward commonwealth. I am predicting that the shift towards statehood will continue to be influenced by fear of losing political stability, in the potential plebiscite of 1998 (see tables 3.3 and 3.8). The shift toward statehood between the 1967 and 1993 plebiscite also can be observed by the influence of fear of economic decline. The presence or lack of influence by economic decline in 1967 was almost even. That is the overall influence by economic decline in 1967 was 44.97 percent, while the lack of influence by the fear of economic decline variable was 44.47 percent. An explanation for this event could be that in 1967 almost all the people in the island were experiencing the benefits of Operation Boot Strap. Therefore no significant majority of people rationalized that the economy was going to deteriorate in the near future (see table 3.7). However, in 1993, the variable of economic decline exercised a 63.7 percent of influence on the voters decision for choosing their particular preference on the status (see table 3.8). Once again the commonwealth won in both years 1967 and 1993. Yet, the difference of economic decline influence between 1967 and 1993 was almost 20 percent more in 1993. Furthermore, the influence of economic decline for 1998 could be 77.2 percent (see table 3.9)

The statehood option might win by a narrow margin in the potential plebiscite of 1998 (tables 3.14 and 3.15). I suggest that the people of Puerto Rico are shifting toward the statehood status option because of fear of economic decline and political instability (tables 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.7, 3.8, 3.9, and 3.17). No shift is indicated from the statehood supporters to the other options within the 22-to-51 age group for 1998. Commonwealth supporters and those who abstained from voting in 1993 also appear to shift toward the statehood option (table 3.10).

Cultural identity could account for the winning margin of the commonwealth option in 1967 and 1993. I am suggesting that in 1967, cultural identity was strong, because most Puerto Ricans were proud of having a local constitution implemented 15 years earlier, and they still were enjoying the benefits of the economic boom provided through Operation Bootstrap. Cultural identity's influence in the people's decisions in this case study was 39.4% (table 3.13 and 3.17) in 1967 and 42.9% in 1993 (table 3.14), a small increase. One could infer that the narrow winning margin of 2.3%, by the commonwealth in 1993 was a result of cultural identity's influence (table 3.17).

It is a function of time before the statehood option to become the majority preference in the island. The trend toward statehood can be observed through the two oldest age groups in this case study (tables 3.5 and 3.6), yet the younger generation is the main supporter of the independence option. Time will allow the younger generations the gaining of enough knowledge to rationalize their options. That is why the independence option as well as support for the PIP remains more or less constant. This may be because young adults are in a sort of rebellious stage and think they can conquer the world.

Moreover, I believe that they react rather than rationalize their actions in search of their identity. Young people are usually the most vulnerable to cultural messages as Stassen Berger notes:

"Young people were especially likely to join the Nazi Party, because finding an identity was particularly important for them (1983, 402)."

The PIP has been able to offer youths a place where they can know who they are, what to believe, and how to behave. However, once they mature a little and begin to weight the cost and benefits instead of reacting, most of them move to another political party and may opt for a different status option (tables 3.10 and 3.11).

Overall, cultural identity's influence in 1998 could be 48.3% (table 3.15). Its influence is present in 1967, increased in 1993, and could increase again in 1998 (tables 3.13, 3.14, 3.15, and 3.17). Applying Stassen Berger's argument:

"... each young person will be exposed to dozens of conflicting values, under the impact of modern technology and science, each generation will see social changes occur at an increasing rate (1983, 400)."

people will commit to or reject a particular political status or party affiliation early in their adulthood at about (17 years of age. However, by their late twenties most people will have moved from exploration to one of stabilization (Stassen Berger 1983, 480). The latter may explain why the PIP maintains a constant percent more or less of 5 within its ranks. It is also the reason only an almost insignificant number of voters opt for independence. That is, the leadership of the independence option relies in the youth and not on seasoned mature adults to keep its hopes alive.

The overall shift toward the statehood option cannot be explained based on cultural identity or party preference (table 3.16); rather it is explained based on the influence of the political instability and economic decline predictors (table 3. 17). One can see (table 3.16) that some people belong to or vote for a particular political party, yet at the time of choosing a status option they may opt for one that is not supported by their political party. In addition, mixed voters or non-party voters are not present in 1967, while they are present in 1993 and possibly in 1998. Therefore, political party preference does not equate to status preference. Yet, an addendum to interpreting table 3.17 could be that cultural identity, as I defined it, is no longer based on cultural and family traditions. It also is assumed that other reasons influence people's decision, but the majority of voters conduct a cost and benefit analysis on those reasons.

Humacao served as a good case study because its overall development parallels the development of Puerto Rico. Both Humacao and Puerto Rico, used to have an agriculturally based economy that relied mainly on sugarcane production. Puerto Rico's and Humacao's economy turned from an agricultural to an industrial-based economy by the mid-twentieth century. The political agenda of the city as well as of Puerto Rico was dominated by the autonomists, later the commonwealth, leadership. The commonwealth hegemony in the political agenda turned to a more balanced control between the commonwealth and statehood supporters' leadership. However, the statehood supporters are now the majority in the government of Humacao and of Puerto Rico. Humacao grew from a village to a city and seat of the electoral district under Spanish control. A similar occurrence happened to the island, when Spain granted the status of province to Puerto

Table 3.2
Political Instability 1967

Category	Count	% of Responses
Yes	91	50.6
No	72	40.0
I don't know	17	9.4
	-----	-----
Total response	180	100.0

60 missing cases (not applicable); 60 valid cases

Table 3.3
Political Instability 1993

Category	Count	% of Responses
Yes	190	70.4
No	72	26.7
I don't know	8	3.0
	-----	-----
Total responses	270	100.0

30 missing (not applicable) cases: 90 valid cases

Table 3.4
Political Stability 1998

Category	Count	% of Responses
Yes	298	82.8
No	62	17.2
	-----	-----
Total responses	360	100.0

Table 3.5
Political Status Preference 1967, 1993 and 1998
Older than 51 Age Group

Status Preference 1967				Total
STA	COM	IND	ABS	
14	30	1	15	60
23.3%	50.0%	1.7%	25.0%	100%
Status Preference 1993				
STA	COM	IND	ABS	
21	34	1	4	60
35.0%	56.7%	1.7%	6.7%	100%
Status Preference 1998				
STA	COM	IND	F ASN	
25	32	1	2	60
41.7%	53.3%	1.7%	3.3%	100%

STA=Statehood, COM=Commonwealth, IND=Independence, ABS=abstention

Table 3.6
Status Preference 1993
Older than 51, and 22-51 Age Groups

			Status Preference 1993				Total
			STA	COM	IND	ABS	
Voting Potential	>51yrs	Count	21	34	1	4	60
		% within Voting Potential	35.5%	56.7%	1.7%	6.7%	100 %
30	21-52 yrs	Count	12		15		3
		% within Voting Potential	40.0%	50.0%		10.0%	100 %
Total		Count	33	49	1	7	90
		% within Voting Potential	36.7%	54.4%	1.1%	7.8%	100 %

STA=Statehood, COM=Commonwealth, IND=Independence, ABS=Abstention

Table 3.7
Economic Decline 1967

Category	Count	% of Responses
Yes	81	45.0
No	80	44.4
I don't know	19	0.6
<hr/>		
Total responses	180	100.0

60 missing cases (not applicable); 60 valid cases

Table 3.8
Economic Decline 1993

Category	Count	% of Responses
Yes	172	63.7
No	86	31.9
I don't know	12	4.4
<hr/>		
Total responses	270	100.0

30 missing cases (not applicable); 90 valid cases

Table 3.9
Economic Decline 1998

Category	Count	% of Responses	
Yes	278	77.2	
No	80	22.2	
I don't know	2	.6	
<hr/>			
Total responses	360	100.0	300.0

Table 3.10
Status Preference Age Group 22 to less than 52

Status Preference 1993			Total
STA	COM	ABS	
12	15	1	30
40.0%	50.0%	10.0%	100.0%

Status Preference 1998			
STA	COM	F ASN	
19	9	2	30
63.3%	30.0%	6.7%	100%

STA=Statehood, COM=Commonwealth, ABS=Abstention, F ASN=Free Association

Table 3.11
Status Preference 1998, All Age Groups

			Status Preference 1993				Total
			STA	COM	IND	F ASN	
Voting Potential	>51yrs	Count	25	32	1	2	60
		% within Voting Potential	41.7%	53.3%	1.7%	3.3%	100%
	22-51 yrs	Count	19	9		2	30
		% within Voting Potential	63.3%	30.0%		6.7%	100%
	< 22 yrs	Count	11	13	6		30
		% within Voting Potential	36.7%	43.3%	20%		100%
	Total	Count	55	54	7	4	120
		% within Voting Potential	45.8%	45%	5.8%	3.3%	100%

STA=Statehood, COM=Commonwealth, IND=Independence, F ASN=Free Association

Table 3.12
Status Preference 1967, 1993, and 1998

			Status Preference 1967				Total
			STA	COM	IND	ABS	
Voting Potential	>51yrs	Count	14	30	1	15	60
		% within Voting Potential	23.3%	50%	1.7%	25%	100%
Total		Count	14	30	1	15	60
		% within Voting Potential	23.3%	50%	1.7%	25%	100%
			Status Preference 1993				Total
			STA	COM	IND	ABS	
Voting Potential	>51yrs	Count	21	34	1	4	60
		% within Voting Potential	35%	56.7%	1.7%	6.7%	100%
	21-51 yrs	Count	12	15		3	30
		% within Voting Potential	40%	50%		10%	100%
Total		Count	33	49	1	7	90
		% within Voting Potential	36.7%	54.4%	1.1%	7.8%	100%
			Status Preference 1993				Total
			STA	COM	IND	ABS	
Voting Potential	>51yrs	Count	25	32	1	2	60
		% within Voting Potential	41.7%	53.3%	1.7%	6.7%	100%
	21-51 yrs	Count	19	9		2	30
		% within Voting Potential	63.3%	30%		6.7%	100%
	< 22 yrs	Count	11	13	6		30
		% within Voting Potential	36.7%	43.3%	20%		100%
Total		Count	55	49	1	7	90
		% within Voting Potential	45.8%	45%	5.8%	3.3%	100%

STA=Statehood, COM=Commonwealth, IND=Independence, ABS=Abstention, F
ASN=Free Association

Table 3.13
Cultural Identity 1967

Category	Count	% of Responses
Yes	71	39.4
No	93	51.7
I don't know	16	8.9
<hr/>		
Total responses	180	100.0

60 missing cases (not applicable); 60 valid cases

Table 3.14
Cultural Identity 1993

Category	Count	% of Responses
Yes	116	43.0
No	146	54.1
I don't know	8	3.0
<hr/>		
Total responses	270	100.0

30 missing cases (not applicable); 90 valid cases

Table 3.15
Cultural Identity 1998

Category	Count	% of Responses
Yes	174	48.3
No	186	51.7
<hr/>		
Total responses	360	100.0

Table 3.16
Status vs. Party Preference

			Status Preference 1967				Total
			STA	COM	IND	ABS	
Party Preference	PNP	Count	10	8		7	25
		% within Party Preference	40%	32%	28%	100%	
	PPD	Count	4	22	6	32	
		% within Party Preference	12.5%	68.8%		18.8%	100%
	PIP	Count			1	2	3
		% within Party Preference			33.3%	66.7%	100%
Total	Count		14	30	1	15	60
	% within Party Preference		23.3%	50%	1.7%	25%	100%

			Status Preference 1993				Total
			STA	COM	IND	ABS	
Party Preference	PNP	Count	25	6		2	17
		% within Party Preference	78.4%	16.2%		5.4%	100%
	PPD	Count	1	41	2	44	
		% within Party Preference	2.3%	93.2%		4.5%	100%
	PIP	Count	2	1	1	1	5
		% within Party Preference	40%	20%	20%	20%	100%
Mix	Count	1	1	2	4		
	% within Party Preference	25%	25%		50%	100%	
Total	Count		33	49	1	7	90
	% within Party Preference		36.7%	54.4%	1.1%	7.8%	100%

			Status Preference 1998				Total
			STA	COM	IND	F ASS	
Party Preference	PNP	Count	42	5		1	48
		% within Party Preference	87.5%	10.4%	2.1%	100%	
	PPD	Count	8	44	1	2	55
		% within Party Preference	14.5%	80%	1.8%	3.6%	100%
	PIP	Count	2	1	5	1	9
		% within Party Preference	22.2%	11.1%	55.6%	11.1%	100%
Mix	Count	3	4	1		8	
	% within Party Preference	37.5%	50%	12.5%	100%		
Total	Count		55	54	7	4	120
	% within Party Preference		45.8%	45%	5.8%	3.3%	100%

Table 3.17
Predictor's Influence on Status Preference

PREDICTORS	Year								
	1967			1993			1998		
	STA	COM	OTHER	STA	COM	OTHER	STA	COM	OTHER
ECONOMY	18.3%	26.7%	0%	29.6%	34.1%	0%	40%	33.6%	3.6%
POLITICAL INSTABILITY	18.3%	30.6%	1.7%	30%	40%	0.37%	39.7%	38.1%	4.97%
CULTURAL IDENTITY	11.1%	26.7%	1.6%	6.3%	36.3%	0.3%	8.3%	33.6%	6.4%

Rico in the late nineteenth century. However, whatever gains Puerto Rico achieved in the political arena under Spanish control came to an end as a result of the aftermath of the Spanish-American war.

The relationship between the United States and Puerto Rico continue to develop through the years, from almost no representation by the locals in their local government to a self government under the commonwealth by 1950. However, the commonwealth is not a sovereign government, and as I have tried to highlight with this case study, the majority, however small it may be of the people no longer want this type of relationship because it is not meeting their needs. The influence of the fear of economic decline and political instability are producing a shift toward statehood as the political status choice of preference for the people of Puerto Rico.

CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION

The shift toward statehood in the status preference of the people in Puerto Rico, is because of fear of economic decline and political instability like Latin America, if ties with the United States are not guaranteed. The political status issue of Puerto Rico dates to Spanish control. The condition of colonial status evolved from Spanish control to U.S. control. The United States gained control over Puerto Rico one year after the latter acquired its autonomy from Spain. The change in sovereignty also brought a change or realignment within the local political parties and within the political status of Puerto Rico.

Puerto Rico's present political status is characterized by almost total exclusion of the people of Puerto Rico from the decision-making process of the nation, including the resident commissioner in Washington. That is, U.S. citizens whose legal residence is Puerto Rico are excluded from the national decision-making process because of lack of representation in Congress. Furthermore, the residents of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico have no voting representation in Congress and no right to vote in presidential elections.

Puerto Rico has held local elections every four years since 1920. Although the United States used to practically hold all political control in the island, this situation changed by the mid-twentieth century with ratification of the Puerto Rican constitution and when all the local governmental positions became elected by popular vote or

appointed by those elected. The achievement of a local constitution reflected democratic principles, but it also served U.S. foreign policy as Brownback noted:

This view point was affirmed by the testimony of Edward G. Miller, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American affairs, who said, "I think that it will help our prestige and our program throughout Latin America if we give this added recognition of self government to Puerto Rico (1966, 271)."

The political leaders gave priority to the economic development rather than to politics after 1950. This, I believe, is the principal reason for the relative stability of the political process in Puerto Rico. However, the separatist or independence supporters' angle was toward nationalism rather than economics (Mitchell 1972, 101). The talent of the political leaders of the 1950s through the 1970s as exemplified by Muñoz Marín, Sánchez Vilella, and Ferré gave priority to legality and pluralism. María T. Padilla wrote in an article published in *The Orlando Sentinel*, Wednesday, March 26, 1997:

But even as the party rivals attacked each other in public, the party leaders maintained a private friendship and affection for each other. Former Gov. Luis A. Ferré, the pro-statehood governor who succeeded Sánchez Vilella, had this to say: "We were political adversaries for 50 years, but we were friends since our youth."

The political leadership demonstrated that political opponents were not to be public enemies to each other. This is another reason for the stable political arena in Puerto Rico. However, the political leadership, including commonwealth supporters, did not actively pursue popular support on the status option that they supported, except in the early 1950s, and during the 1967 and 1993 plebiscites. Traditional beliefs were static and based on a hierarchical structure of authority. But as people grew older and gained experience, their ideas changed and became open for competition at all levels and sectors of society.

Therefore, the current status does not appear to answer the majority of the people's needs on the island.

The people of Puerto Rico cannot directly vote to elect the people who would represent and vote for their interests in the U.S. Congress and the executive branch.

Gautier said:

The Puerto Rican elected government was left the control of purely local matters, administering the economy, but was never able to make the important decisions on the legs supporting it (1994, 167).

The proponents of the status quo would like the authority to enter into international treaties with other countries and still maintain the no tax, no vote existing at the federal level. However, the people of Puerto Rico pay into the national Social Security system. Indirectly the people of Puerto Rico get to vote at the national level because of their participation in the presidential primaries and in the mainland major political parties' national conventions. It seems that the autonomous status, instead of becoming more independent, has evolved into a more permanent versus independent one as demonstrated by the celebration of Republican and Democrat presidential primaries on the island.

Dependence on U.S. capital investments and markets remains the norm. The dependence of the GNP on federal transfers, about 30 percent, (Gautier 1994, 166) make the economy of the island very volatile. The intention of most of these federal transfers was to aid in ensuring a minimum level of quality of life. However it appears that it has created a community of people at the low-income level who are unwilling to accept a job

that would pay them less than the available public assistance. This is another reason of why there is not a strong movement seeking the independence of Puerto Rico.

The reality is that the overwhelming majority of the people of Puerto Rico do not want independence as reflected in all the elections from 1948 to the present. The separatist movement is small, but it has enough votes to tilt the balance of power to the commonwealth (PPD) or statehood (PNP) side. I think, based on this case study, that the trend is to move toward full integration, that is, statehood.

The interviewed subjects in Humacao and the people of Puerto Rico acted out of fear of economic decline and political instability and on cultural identity predictors when they selected their political status options in 1967 and 1993. Even though the commonwealth option won in both plebiscites, the margin of the win in 1993 was only 2.3 percent. The local economy was booming at the time of the first plebiscite, in 1967. Puerto Ricans had moved up from mere subsistence or meeting basic survival needs to a better quality of life under the commonwealth and PPD leadership. Therefore, people felt that the commonwealth was the option that would provide or maintain a strong economy and stable political system without losing their cultural identity.

The predictors- - fear of economic decline and fear of political instability- - influence were present in both plebiscites. Moreover, the presence of these predictors' influence on people's thinking has increased over time, and so has the preference for the statehood option. The effect of these predictors is more prevalent in the 22-51 age group, which grew up not worrying about meeting basic needs but in finding a job in the industrial economy and not in the sugarcane fields. The industrial environment was very

different than the environment of the 1940s to late 1960s. However, the influence of cultural identity has not increased as much as the other two predictors just as the support for the commonwealth is winding down. Therefore, the fear of economic decline (poverty) and of political instability (a dictatorship) as has happened in the Caribbean and other Latin American countries, eventually will make statehood the winning status option.

APPENDIX A
TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND SPAIN
DECEMBER 10, 1998

The United States of America and Her Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain, in the name of her august son Don Alfonso XIII, desiring to end the state of war now existing between the two countries, have for that purpose appointed as plenipotentiaries:

The President of the United States,

William R. Day, Cushman K. Davis, William P. Frye, George Gray, and Whitelaw Reid,
citizens of the United States;

And Her Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain,

Don Eugenio Montero Rios, president of the senate, Don Buenaventura de Abarzuza, senator of the Kingdom and ex-minister of the Crown; Don Jose de Garnica, deputy of the Cortes and associate justice of the supreme court; Don Wenceslao Ramirez de Villa-Urrutia, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary at Brussels, and Don Rafael Cerero, general of division;

Who, having assembled in Paris, and having exchanged their full powers, which were found to be in due and proper form, have, after discussion of the matters before them, agreed upon the following articles:

Article I.

Spain relinquishes all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba.

And as the island is, upon its evacuation by Spain, to be occupied by the United States, the United States will, so long as such occupation shall last, assume and discharge the obligations that may under international law result from the fact of its occupation, for the protection of life and property.

Article II.

Spain cedes to the United States the island of Porto Rico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, and the island of Guam in the Marianas or Ladrones.

Article III.

Spain cedes to the United States the archipelago known as the Philippine islands, and comprehending the islands lying within the following line:

A line running from west to east along or near the twentieth parallel of north latitude, and through the middle of the navigable channel of Bachi, from the one hundred and eighteenth (118th) to the one hundred and twenty-seventh (127th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, thence along the one hundred and twenty-seventh (127th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich to the parallel of four degrees and forty five minutes (4 [degree symbol] 45') north latitude, thence along the parallel of four degrees and forty five minutes (4 [degree symbol] 45') north latitude to its intersection with the meridian of longitude one hundred and nineteen degrees and thirty five minutes (119 [degree symbol] 35') east of Greenwich, thence along the meridian of longitude one hundred and nineteen degrees and thirty five minutes (119 [degree symbol] 35') east of Greenwich to the parallel of latitude seven degrees and forty minutes (7 [degree symbol] 40') north, thence along the parallel of latitude of seven degrees and forty minutes (7 [degree symbol] 40') north to its intersection with the one hundred and sixteenth (116th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, thence by a direct line to the intersection of the tenth (10th) degree parallel of north latitude with the one hundred and eighteenth (118th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, and thence along the one hundred and eighteenth (118th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich to the point of beginning.

The United States will pay to Spain the sum of twenty million dollars (\$20,000,000) within three months after the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty.

Article IV.

The United States will, for the term of ten years from the date of the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty, admit Spanish ships and merchandise to the ports of the Philippine islands on the same terms as ships and merchandise of the United States.

Article V.

The United States will, upon the signature of the present treaty, send back to Spain, at its own cost, the Spanish soldiers taken as prisoners of war on the capture of Manila by the American forces. The arms of the soldiers in question shall be restored to them.

Spain, will, upon the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty, proceed to evacuate the Philippines, as well as the island of Guam, on terms similar to those agreed upon by the Commissioners appointed to arrange for the evacuation of Porto Rico and other islands in the West Indies, under the Protocol of August 12, 1898, which is to continue in force till its provisions are completely executed.

The time within which the evacuation of the Philippine islands and Guam shall be completed shall be fixed by the two Governments. Stands of colors, uncaptured war vessels, small arms, guns of all calibres, with their carriages and accessories, powder, ammunition, livestock, and materials and supplies of all kinds, belonging to the land and naval forces of Spain in the Philippines and Guam, remain the property of Spain. Pieces of heavy ordnance, exclusive of field artillery, in the fortifications and coast defences, shall remain in their emplacements for the term of six months, to be reckoned from the exchange of ratifications of the treaty; and the United States may, in the meantime, purchase such material from Spain, if a satisfactory agreement between the two Governments on the subject shall be reached.

Article VI.

Spain will, upon the signature of the present treaty, release all prisoners of war, and all persons detained or imprisoned for political offences, in connection with the insurrections in Cuba and the Philippines and the war with the United States.

Reciprocally, the United States will release all persons made prisoners of war by the American forces, and will undertake to obtain the release of all Spanish prisoners in the hands of the insurgents in Cuba and the Philippines.

The Government of the United States will at its own cost return to Spain and the Government of Spain will at its own cost return to the United States, Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines, according to the situation of their respective homes, prisoners released or caused to be released by them, respectively, under this article.

Article VII.

The United States and Spain mutually relinquish all claims for indemnity, national and individual, of every kind, of either Government, or of its citizens or subjects, against the other Government, that may have arisen since the beginning of the late insurrection in

Cuba and prior to the exchange of ratifications of the present treaty, including all claims for indemnity for the cost of the war.

The United States will adjudicate and settle the claims of its citizens against Spain relinquished in this article.

Article VIII.

In conformity with the provisions of Articles I, II, and III of this treaty, Spain relinquishes in Cuba, and cedes in Porto Rico and other islands in the West Indies,

in the island of Guam, and in the Philippine Archipelago, all the buildings, wharves, barracks, forts, structures, public highways and other immovable property which, in conformity with law, belong to the public domain, and as such belong to the Crown of Spain.

And it is hereby declared that the relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, to which the preceding paragraph refers, can not in any respect impair the property or rights which by law belong to the peaceful possession of property of all kinds, of provinces, municipalities, public or private establishments, ecclesiastical or civic bodies, or any other associations having legal capacity to acquire and possess property in the aforesaid territories renounced or ceded, or of private individuals, of whatsoever nationality such individuals may be.

The aforesaid relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, includes all documents exclusively referring to the sovereignty relinquished or ceded that may exist in the archives of the Peninsula. Where any document in such archives only in part relates to said sovereignty, a copy of such part will be furnished whenever it shall be requested. Like rules shall be reciprocally observed in favor of Spain in respect of documents in the archives of the islands above referred to.

In the aforesaid relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, are also included such rights as the Crown of Spain and its authorities possess in respect of the official archives and records, executive as well as judicial, in the islands above referred to, which relate to said islands or the rights and property of their inhabitants. Such archives and records shall be carefully preserved, and private persons shall without distinction have the right to require, in accordance with the law, authenticated copies of the contracts, wills and other instruments forming part of notarial protocols or files, or which may be contained in the executive or judicial archives, be the latter in Spain or in the islands aforesaid.

Article IX.

Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes sovereignty, may remain in such territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in either event all their rights of property, including the right to sell or dispose of such property or of its proceeds; and they shall also have the right to carry on their industry, commerce, and professions, being subject in respect thereof to such laws as are applicable to other foreigners. In case they remain in the territory they may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making, before a court of record, within a year from the date of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a declaration of their decision to preserve such allegiance; in default of which declaration they shall be held to have renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the territory in which they may reside.

The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by Congress.

Article X.

The inhabitants of the territories over which Spain relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty shall be secured in the free exercise of their religion.

Article XI.

The Spaniards residing in the territories over which Spain by this treaty cedes or relinquishes her sovereignty shall be subject in matters civil as well as criminal to the jurisdiction of the courts of the country wherein they reside, pursuant to the ordinary laws governing the same; and they shall have the right to appear before such courts, and to pursue the same course as citizens of the country to which the courts belong.

Article XII.

Judicial proceedings pending at the time of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty in the territories over which Spain relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty shall be determined according to the following rules:

1. Judgments rendered either in civil suits between private individuals, or in criminal matters, before the date mentioned, and with respect to which there is no recourse or right of review under the Spanish law, shall be deemed to be final, and shall be executed in due form by competent authority in the territory within which such judgments should be carried out.

2. Civil suits between private individuals which may on the date mentioned be undetermined shall be prosecuted to judgment before the court in which they may then be pending or in the court that may be substituted therefor.

3. Criminal actions pending on the date mentioned before the Supreme Court of Spain against citizens of the territory which by this treaty ceases to be Spanish shall continue under its jurisdiction until final judgment; but, such judgment having been rendered, the execution thereof shall be committed to the competent authority of the place in which the case arose.

Article XIII.

The rights of property secured by copyrights and patents acquired by Spaniards in the island of Cuba and in Porto Rico, the Philippines and other ceded territories, at the time of the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty, shall continue to be respected. Spanish scientific, literary and artistic works, not subversive of public order in the territories in question, shall continue to be admitted free of duty into such territories, for the period of ten years, to be reckoned from the date of the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty.

Article XIV.

Spain will have the power to establish consular officers in the ports and places of the territories, the sovereignty over which has been either relinquished or ceded by the present treaty.

Article XV.

The Government of each country will, for the term of ten years, accord to the merchant vessels of the other country the same treatment in respect of all port charges, including entrance and clearance dues, light dues, and tonnage duties, as it accords to its own merchant vessels, not engaged in the coastwise trade.

Article XVI.

It is understood that any obligations assumed in this treaty by the United States with respect to Cuba are limited to the time of its occupancy thereof; but it will upon termination of such occupancy, advise any Government established in the island to assume the same obligations.

Article XVII.

The present treaty shall be ratified by the President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate thereof, and by Her Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain;

and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Washington within six months from the date hereof, or earlier if possible.

In faith whereof, we, the respective Plenipotentiaries, have signed this treaty and have hereunto affixed our seals.

Done in duplicate at Paris, the tenth day of December, in the year of Our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight.

[Seal] William R. Day
[Seal] Cushman K. Davis
[Seal] William P. Frye
[Seal] Geo. Gray
[Seal] Whitelaw Reid
[Seal] Eugenio Montero Rios
[Seal] B. de Abarzuza
[Seal] J. de Garnica
[Seal] W. R. de Villa Urrutia
[Seal] Rafael Cerero

Text from *A Treaty of Peace Between the United States and Spain*, U.S. Congress, 55th Cong., 3d sess., Senate Doc. No. 62, Part 1 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1899), 5-11.

APPENDIX B
VARIABLE RESPONSES 1967, 1993, AND 1998

It will improve my economic situation 1967		Frequency Percent		Valid Percent
Valid	Yes	29	24.2	48.3
	No	25	20.8	41.7
	I don't know	6	5.0	10.0
	Total	60	50.0	100.0
Missing	NA	60	50.0	
Total		120	100.0	

It will improve my economic situation 1993		Frequency Percent		Valid Percent
Valid	Yes	56	46.7	62.2
	No	30	25.0	33.3
	I don't know	4	3.3	4.4
	Total	90	75.0	100.0
Missing	NA	30	25.0	
Total		120	100.0	

It will improve my economic situation 1998		Frequency Percent		Valid Percent
Valid	Yes	94	78.3	78.3
	No	26	21.7	21.7
	Total	120	100.0	100.0

It will improve the political stability of the island 1967

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Valid	Yes	34	28.3	56.7
	No	18	15.0	30.0
	I don't know	8	6.7	13.3
	Total	60	50.0	100.0
Missing	NA	60	50.0	
Total		120	100.0	

It will improve the political stability of the island 1993

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Valid	Yes	68	56.7	75.6
	No	18	15.0	20.0
	I don't know	4	3.3	4.4
	Total	90	75.0	100.0
Missing	NA	30	25.0	
Total		120	100.0	

It will improve the political stability of the island 1998

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Valid	Yes	112	93.3	93.3
	No	8	6.7	6.7
	Total	120	100.0	100.0

Fear of the possibility of the emergence of a dictatorship 1967

		Frequency Percent		Valid Percent
Valid	Yes	20	16.7	33.3
	No	35	29.2	58.3
	I don't know	5	4.2	8.3
	Total	60	50.0	100.0
Missing	NA	60	50.0	
Total		120	100.0	

Fear of the possibility of the emergence of a dictatorship 1993

		Frequency Percent		Valid Percent
Valid	Yes	48	40.0	53.3
	No	40	33.3	44.4
	I don't know	2	1.7	2.2
	Total	90	75.0	100.0
Missing	NA	30	25.0	
Total		120	100.0	

Fear of the possibility of the emergence of a dictatorship 1998

		Frequency Percent		Valid Percent
Valid	Yes	83	69.2	69.2
	No	37	30.8	30.8
	Total	120	100.0	100.0

Fear that the per capita income will fall below other Latin American countries

1967

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Valid	Yes	23	19.2	38.3
	No	30	25.0	50.0
	I don't know	7	5.8	11.7
	Total	60	50.0	100.0
Missing	NA	60	50.0	
Total		120	100.0	

Fear that the per capita income will fall below other Latin American countries

1993

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Valid	Yes	53	44.2	58.9
	No	33	27.5	36.7
	I don't know	4	3.3	4.4
	Total	90	75.0	100.0
Missing	NA	30	25.0	
Total		120	100.0	

Fear that the per capita income will fall below other Latin American countries

1998

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Valid	Yes	88	73.3	73.3
	No	31	25.8	25.8
	I don't know	1	.8	.8
	Total	120	100.0	100.0

Worry about losing the culture 1967

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Valid	Yes	21	17.5	35.0
	No	34	28.3	56.7
	I don't know	5	4.2	8.3
	Total	60	50.0	100.0
Missing	NA	60	50.0	
Total		120	100.0	

Worry about losing the culture 1993

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Valid	Yes	40	33.3	44.4
	No	48	40.0	53.3
	I don't know	2	1.7	2.2
	Total	90	75.0	100.0
Missing	NA	30	25.0	
Total		120	100.0	

Worry about losing the culture 1998

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Valid	Yes	61	50.8	50.8
	No	59	49.2	49.2
	Total	120	100.0	100.0

Worry about losing the international sports status 1967

		Frequency Percent		Valid Percent
Valid	Yes	21	17.5	35.0
	No	32	26.7	53.3
	I don't know	7	5.8	11.7
	Total	60	50.0	100.0
Missing	NA	60	50.0	
Total		120	100.0	

Worry about losing the international sports status 1993

		Frequency Percent		Valid Percent
Valid	Yes	38	31.7	42.2
	No	48	40.0	53.3
	I don't know	4	3.3	4.4
	Total	90	75.0	100.0
Missing	NA	30	25.0	
Total		120	100.0	

Worry about losing the international sports status 1998

		Frequency Percent		Valid Percent
Valid	Yes	60	50.0	50.0
	No	60	50.0	50.0
	Total	120	100.0	100.0

Retention of the U.S. citizenship 1967

		Frequency Percent		Valid Percent
Valid	Yes	37	30.8	61.7
	No	19	15.8	31.7
	I don't know	4	3.3	6.7
	Total	60	50.0	100.0
Missing	NA	60	50.0	
Total		120	100.0	

Retention of the U.S. citizenship 1993

		Frequency Percent		Valid Percent
Valid	Yes	74	61.7	82.2
	No	14	11.7	15.6
	I don't know	2	1.7	2.2
	Total	90	75.0	100.0
Missing	NA	30	25.0	
Total		120	100.0	

Retention of the U.S. citizenship 1998

		Frequency Percent		Valid Percent
Valid	Yes	103	85.8	85.8
	No	17	14.2	14.2
	Total	120	100.0	100.0

Because it is a family tradition 1967

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Valid	Yes	29	24.2	48.3
	No	27	22.5	45.0
	I don't know	4	3.3	6.7
	Total	60	50.0	100.0
Missing	NA	60	50.0	
Total		120	100.0	

Because it is a family tradition 1993

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Valid	Yes	38	31.7	42.2
	No	50	41.7	55.6
	I don't know	2	1.7	2.2
	Total	90	75.0	100.0
Missing	NA	30	25.0	
Total		120	100.0	

Because it is a family tradition 1998

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Valid	Yes	53	44.2	44.2
	No	67	55.8	55.8
	Total	120	100.0	100.0
Total		120	100.0	

The quality of life in neighboring islands and Latin American countries 1967

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Valid	Yes	29	24.2	48.3
	No	25	20.8	41.7
	I don't know	6	5.0	10.0
	Total	60	50.0	100.0
Missing	NA	60	50.0	
Total		120	100.0	

The quality of life in neighboring islands and Latin American countries 1993

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Valid	Yes	63	52.5	70.0
	No	23	19.2	25.6
	I don't know	4	3.3	4.4
	Total	90	75.0	100.0
Missing	NA	30	25.0	
Total		120	100.0	

The quality of life in neighboring and islands Latin American countries 1998

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Valid	Yes	96	80.0	80.0
	No	23	19.2	19.2
	I don't know	1	.8	.8
	Total	120	100.0	100.0
Total		120	100.0	

APPENDIX C

QUESTIONNAIRE

English Version

- a. SEX
- b. AGE
- c. RESIDENCE URBAN ____ RURAL ____
- d. OCCUPATION
- e. ANNUAL INCOME
- f. EDUCATIONAL LEVEL
- g. WHICH WAS YOUR STATUS PREFERENCE IN 1967?¹ COM ____ STAT ____ IND ____ ABS ____
- h. WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING FACTORS INFLUENCED YOUR DECISION IN 1967?
- | | |
|--|--------------------|
| 1. IT WILL IMPROVE MY ECONOMIC SITUATION | YES_NO_DON'T KNOW_ |
| 2. IT WILL IMPROVE THE POLITICAL STABILITY ON THE ISLAND | YES_NO_DON'T KNOW_ |
| 3. FEAR OF THE POSSIBILITY OF THE EMERGENCE OF A
DICTATORSHIP | YES_NO_DON'TKNOW_ |
| 4. FEAR THAT THE PER CAPITA INCOME WILL FALL BELOW
OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES | YES_NO_DON'T KNOW_ |
| 5. WORRY ABOUT LOSING THE CULTURE
(FOLKLORE, LANGUAGE) | YES_NO_DON'T KNOW_ |
| 6. WORRY ABOUT LOSING THE INTERNATIONAL
SPORTS STATUS | YES_NO_DON'T KNOW_ |
| 7. RETENTION OF THE U.S. CITIZENSHIP | YES_NO_DON'T KNOW_ |
| 8. BECAUSE IT IS A FAMILY TRADITION | YES_NO_DON'T KNOW_ |
| 9. THE QUALITY OF LIFE OF NEIGHBORING ISLANDS AND | |

¹ COM=Commonwealth, STAT=Statehood, IND=Independence, ABS=Abstention

- LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES
- YES _ NO _ DON'T KNOW _
- i. WHICH WAS YOUR STATUS PREFERENCE IN 1993? COM __ STAT __ IND __ ABS __
- j. WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING FACTORS INFLUENCED YOUR DECISION IN 1993?
1. IT WILL IMPROVE MY ECONOMICAL SITUATION YES _ NO _ DON'T KNOW _
 2. IT WILL IMPROVE THE POLITICAL STABILITY OF THE ISLAND YES _ NO _ DON'T KNOW _
 3. FEAR OF THE POSSIBILITY OF THE EMERGENCE OF A
DICTATORSHIP YES _ NO _ DON'T KNOW _
 4. FEAR THAT THE PER CAPITA INCOME GOES BELOW OTHER
LATIN-AMERICAN COUNTRIES YES _ NO _ DON'T KNOW _
 5. WORRY ABOUT LOSING THE CULTURE
(FOLKLORE, LANGUAGE) YES _ NO _ DON'T KNOW _
 6. WORRY ABOUT LOSING THE INTERNATIONAL
SPORTS STATUS YES _ NO _ DON'T KNOW _
 7. RETENTION OF THE U.S. CITIZENSHIP YES _ NO _ DON'T KNOW _
 8. BECAUSE IS A FAMILY TRADITION YES _ NO _ DON'T KNOW _
 9. THE QUALITY OF LIFE OF NEIGHBORING ISLANDS
AND LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES YES _ NO _ DON'T KNOW _
- k. WHICH POLITICAL PARTY DO YOU USUALLY VOTE FOR? WHY? PPD __ PNP __ PIP __
- l. WHICH WOULD BE YOUR STATUS PREFERENCE IN THE
POTENTIAL 1998 PLEBISCITE? COM __ STA __ IND __ FASS __
- m. WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING FACTORS WOULD INFLUENCE YOUR DECISION (FOR 1998)?
1. IT WILL IMPROVE MY ECONOMICAL SITUATION YES _ NO _ DON'T KNOW _
 2. IT WILL IMPROVE THE POLITICAL STABILITY OF THE ISLAND YES _ NO _ DON'T KNOW _
 3. FEAR OF THE POSSIBILITY OF THE EMERGENCE OF A
DICTATORSHIP YES _ NO _ DON'T KNOW _
 4. FEAR THAT THE PER CAPITA INCOME GOES BELOW OTHER
LATIN-AMERICAN COUNTRIES YES _ NO _ DON'T KNOW _
 5. WORRY ABOUT LOSING THE CULTURE
(FOLKLORE, LANGUAGE) YES _ NO _ DON'T KNOW _

6. WORRY ABOUT LOSING THE INTERNATIONAL SPORTS STATUS YES_NO_DON'T KNOW_
7. RETENTION OF THE U.S. CITIZENSHIP YES_NO_DON'T KNOW_
8. BECAUSE IS A FAMILY TRADITION YES_NO_DON'T KNOW_
9. THE QUALITY OF LIFE OF NEIGHBORING ISLANDS AND LATIN AMERICAN YES_NO_DON'T KNOW_
- n. WHICH ARE THE PRINCIPAL GOALS OF YOUR POLITICAL PARTY?
- o. WHAT IS YOUR OPINION ABOUT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT SYSTEM?
- p. WHAT DO YOU THINK ABOUT THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES?
- q. WHAT ARE YOUR FEELINGS TOWARD THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES?
- r. WHICH KIND OF RELATIONSHIP SHOULD EXIST BETWEEN PUERTO RICO AND UNITED STATES?
 POLITICAL__ COMMERCIAL__ CULTURAL__

Spanish Version

- a. SEXO
- b. EDAD
- c. RESIDENCIA URBANA__ RURAL__
- d. OCUPACION
- e. INGRESO ANUAL
- f. NIVEL DE ESCOLARIDAD COMPLETADO
- g. CUAL FUE SU PREFERENCIA DE ESTATUS EN 1967² ELA__E__I__ABSTENCION__
- h. CUALES DE LOS SIGUIENTES FACTORES INFLUYERON EN SU DECISION EN 1967?
1. MEJORIA EN LA SITUACION ECONOMICA PERSONAL YES_NO_DON'T KNOW_
2. ESTABILIDAD POLITICA DE LA ISLA YES_NO_DON'T KNOW_
3. TEMOR A QUE SURGIERA UNA DICTADURA YES_NO_DON'T KNOW_
4. TEMOR A QUE BAJARA EL INGRESO PER CAPITA EN COMPARACION
 CON OTROS PAISES LATINOAMERICANOS YES_NO_DON'T KNOW_

² ELA=Commonwealth, E=Statehood, I=Independence, ABSTENCION=Abstention

5. PREOCUPACION DE PERDER LA CULTURA
(IDIOMA, COSTUMBRES) YES_NO_DONT KNOW_
6. PREOCUPACION DE PERDER EL ESTATUS DEPORTIVO
A NIVEL INTERNACIONAL YES_NO_DONT KNOW_
7. RETENTIOION DE LA CIUDADANIA ESTADOUNIDENSE YES_NO_DONT KNOW_
8. TRADICION FAMILIAR YES_NO_DONT KNOW_
9. CONDICIONES DE VIDA EN ISLAS VECINAS Y PAISES
LATINOAMERICANOS YES_NO_DONT KNOW_
- i. CUAL FUE SU PREFERENCIA DE ESTATUS EN 1993? COM__STAT__IND__ABS__
- j. CUALES DE LOS SIGUIENTES FACTORES INFLUYERON EN SU DECISION EN 1993?
1. MEJORIA EN LA SITUACION ECONOMICA PERSONAL YES_NO_DONT KNOW_
2. ESTABILIDAD POLITICA DE LA ISLA YES_NO_DONT KNOW_
3. TEMOR A QUE SURGIERA UNA DICTADURA YES_NO_DONT KNOW_
4. TEMOR A QUE BAJARA EL INGRESO PER CAPITA YES_NO_DONT KNOW_
EN COMPARACION CON OTROS PAISES LATINOAMERICANOS
5. PREOCUPACION DE PERDER LA CULTURA
(IDIOMA, COSTUMBRES) YES_NO_DONT KNOW_
6. PREOCUPACION DE PERDER EL ESTATUS DEPORTIVO YES_NO_DONT KNOW_
7. RETENTIOION DE LA CIUDADANIA ESTADOUNIDENSE YES_NO_DONT KNOW_
8. TRADICION FAMILIAR YES_NO_DONT KNOW_
9. CONDICIONES DE VIDA EN ISLAS VECINAS Y PAISES
LATINOAMERICANOS YES_NO_DONT KNOW_
- k. POR QUE PARTIDO ACOSTUMBRA VOTAR EN LAS ELECCIONES PPD__ PNP__ pIP__
POR QUE
- l. CUAL SERIA SU PREFERENCIA DE ESTATUS DE CELEBRASE UN
PLEBISCITO EN 1998³ ELA__E__IND__ LIBRE ASOCIACION
- m. CUALES DE LOS SIGUIENTES FACTORES INFLUYEN EN SU DECISION
1. MEJORIA EN LA SITUACION ECONOMICA PERSONAL YES_NO_DONT KNOW_

³ LIBRE ASSOCIACION=Free Association

- | | | |
|----|--|-------------------------|
| 2. | ESTABILIDAD POLITICA DE LA ISLA | YES_NO_DONT KNOW_ |
| 3. | TEMOR A QUE SURGIERA UNA DICTADURA | YES_NO_DONT KNOW_ |
| 4. | TEMOR A QUE BAJARA EL INGRESO PER CAPITA EN COMPARACION
CON OTROS PAISES LATINOAMERICANOS | YES_NO_DONT KNOW_ |
| 5. | PREOCUPACION DE PERDER LA CULTURA
(IDIOMA, COSTUMBRES) | YES_NO_DONT KNOW_ |
| 6. | PREOCUPACION DE PERDER EL ESTATUS DEPORTIVO
A NIVEL INTERNACIONAL | YES_NO_DONT KNOW_ |
| 7. | RETENTIOION DE LA CIUDADANIA ESTADOUNIDENSE | YES_NO_DONT KNOW_ |
| 8. | TRADICION FAMILIAR | YES_NO_DONT KNOW_ |
| 9. | CONDICIONES DE VIDA EN ISLAS VECINAS Y PAISES
LATINOAMERICANOS | YES_NO_DONT KNOW_ |
| n. | CUALES SON LOS POSTULADOS PRINCIPALES DE SU PARTIDO POLITICO | |
| o. | QUE OPINA USED SOBRE EL SISTEMA DE GOBIERNO ESTADOUNIDENSE | |
| p. | CUAL ES SU OPINION SOBRE EL PUEBLO ESTADOUNIDENSE | |
| q. | QUE CLASE DE RELACION DEBERIA EXISTIR ENTRE PUERTO RICO Y LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS | |
| | POLITICA__ | COMERICIAL__ CULTURAL__ |

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
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
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Milton O. Rodriguez was born in Humacao, Puerto Rico, in 1958. He possesses a baccalaureate degree in English with a minor in education from the University of Puerto Rico, Humacao campus. Currently, he serves in the U.S. Army as an aviator and foreign area officer (FAO).


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Terry L. McCoy, Chair
Professor of Latin American Studies

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts.



David P. Geggus
Professor of History


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Philip J. Williams
Associate Professor of Political Science

This thesis was submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Center for Latin American Studies, to the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, and to the Graduate School and was accepted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

May, 1998


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Studies


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